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ABSTRACT
This paper first familiarizes the reader with the concept of real estate
investment trusts (REITs), then presents some theories on the costs and issues
associated with initial public offerings (IPOs) in general, and finally, tests the
applicability of those IPO theories against a sample of equity REIT IPOs.
The sample consists of 13 equity REIT IPOs which took place between
November, 1991 and June, 1993. Sources of information include the
prospectuses, New York Stock Exchange trading statistics, publications in
journals and newspapers, and interviews with various investors, advisors, and
issuers of equity REIT IPOs.
The paper determines that a previous study on IPOs substantially
underestimates the direct costs of equity REIT IPOs. It concludes that the
underwriter's reputation or prestige is not a determining factor in the "success"
of an equity REIT IPO. It also confirms that a trading strategy of "flipping"
equity REIT IPO shares will result in superior returns for institutional investors,
who because of their size and volume of business are the preferred customers
of underwriters, and therefore receive a disproportionate share of "good" equity
REIT IPOs. Observations are also made regarding other issues such as
information disclosure, hot IPO markets, trading volume, and liquidity of equity
REIT IPOs.
Thesis Supervisor: Stewart C. Myers
Title: Professor of Finance
Sloan School of Management
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CHAPTER 1 - REITs
1.1 Background
The real estate investment trust (REIT) industry was started in 1960
when President Eisenhower signed into law the Real Estate Investment Trust
Act.' This act provided changes in the tax code that would allow all investors,
rather than just the extremely wealthy, to participate in the ownership and
financing of large commercial real estate projects.2 A REIT is essentially a real
estate mutual fund that pools the financial resources of many investors, and
issues them shares of stock. Each investor owns a pro rata share of the
REIT's interest in a property or pool of properties.
1.2 Types of REITs
There are three major types of REITs; equity REITs, mortgage REITs,
and hybrid REITs. Equity REITs invest at least 75 percent of their assets in
the ownership of real estate or other equity interests in real estate. Mortgage
REITs invest at least 75 percent of their assets in mortgages secured by real
estate. Hybrid REITs are a combination of equity and mortgages. REITs can
'National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, REIT
Formation and Operation: Opportunities in Today's Real Estate
Capital Markets, The REIT Concept, Washington, D.C., 1993, p.9.
2National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts,
Frequently Asked Questions About REITs, Washington, D.C., February,
1993, p.5.
be further classified as finite life, open-ended, etc. For the remainder of this
paper I will be referring only to publicly traded equity REITs, unless otherwise
noted.
1.3 Qualifying As A REIT
There are certain basic qualifications that a REIT must meet in order to
be recognized as a REIT for tax purposes. The tax treatment of a REIT is one
of its most attractive features, since a REIT pays no federal income tax.
Income is only taxed at the shareholder level, when dividends and capital gains
are distributed. The basic qualifications are:
a) The REIT must be a corporation or business trust. It cannot be a
form of a partnership.
b) The REIT must be managed by a board of directors or trustees,
the majority of whom are independent from the REIT.
c) REIT shares must be freely and fully transferrable.
d) There must be at least 100 shareholders of the REIT. This is
often referred to as "widely held".
e) No group of five or fewer individuals may own directly or indirectly
more than 50 percent of the REIT's shares during the last half of
each taxable year.
f) A REIT must invest at least 75 percent of its total assets in real
estate assets.
g) A REIT may not own more than 10 percent of the voting shares of
another company (other than another REIT).
h) No more than 5 percent of the REIT's total assets may be
invested in the shares of one company (other than another REIT).
i) At least 75 percent of the REIT's gross revenues must come from
rents from real property, interest on mortgages on real property,
gains from the sale of real property, dividends or gains from
investments in other REITs.
j) At least 95 percent of the REIT's gross revenues must come from
sources listed in item (i) above, plus gains from the sale of
securities, dividends and interest from other investments.
k) No more than 30 percent of the REIT's gross revenues may come
from the sale or disposition of real property held for less than four
years, (with some exceptions for foreclosures), securities held for
less than six months, or certain other "prohibited transactions". In
other words, REITs are in the investment and management
business, not the brokerage business.
1) The REIT must distribute at least 95 percent of its taxable income
as dividends, excluding capital gains.3
3Ibid. , pp.35-36.
For a more complete description of the requirements for qualification as
a REIT, including asset tests, income tests, distribution requirements, disclosure
requirements, operational requirements, etc., contact the National Association of
Real Estate Investment Trusts, Inc. (NAREIT), 1129 Twentieth Street, N.W.,
Suite 705, Washington, D.C., 20036. The telephone number is 202-785-8717.
1.4 Why REITs Are Attractive to Investors.
In addition to the tax advantages previously mentioned, there are a
number of other attributes which make REITs attractive to both retail and
institutional investors. They include the following 4
a) REITs provide liquidity to investments in real estate. For example, if the
owner of an apartment building suddenly needed a substantial amount of
money and had no assets other than the apartment building, she might
be forced to sell the property at a substantial discount in order to raise
the money she needed. Furthermore, this process would take several
days at a minimum, and probably several months. On the other hand, if
she had instead owned a number of shares in a REIT, she would be able
to quickly sell as many shares as needed to raise the money. Since
4 Primary references include: David A. Lecander, "Real Estate
Securities in a Pension Fund Investment Program," (Unpublished),
May 11, 1993; John P. McCann, "REITs Gain Stature As Vehicles for
Real Estate Investments," Lawyers Title News, Winter, 1993; and
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, "Real Estate
Investment Trusts: Frequently Asked Questions ...".
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REIT shares are traded on the major stock exchanges, investors are
always prepared to either buy or sell them, hence providing liquidity.
b) Experienced, dedicated managers of REITs are able to maximize
profits by implementing skills and strategies acquired through many
years in the real estate industry. These managers generally own shares
in the REIT as well, and therefore their interests are aligned with the
shareholders. Conflicts of interest are minimized because the REIT
manager's only real estate investments are usually those of the REIT.
Separate accounts, commingled funds, and partnerships on the other
hand, potentially expose an investor to many more conflicts of interest.
For example, when real estate investment managers/advisors have
several clients, how do they determine which client will get the next good
deal. Is it the biggest client, the one who pays the highest fee, the
golfing partner, or what?
c) REITs provide a relatively high level of current income. The 95 percent
distribution rule, as well as management's recognition that REIT investors
are income-oriented, ensures stability and consistency in the payment of
dividends. In private investment, the manager has more discretion over
whether or not to distribute any earnings at all.
d) REITs are priced continuously. Since stocks are traded on a daily
basis, an investor can simply open up the newspaper to see what his
investment is worth on a particular day. On the other hand, the appraisal
method used to value privately owned real estate involves making
assumptions about growth and subjective estimates of values.
Furthermore, properties are often appraised on an annual basis, and
even less frequently than that.
e) Portfolio diversification can be achieved even with a small investment.
Some REITs contain only certain property types (i.e. retail, industrial,
office, apartments, hotels, etc.), while others concentrate more on the
geographical location (i.e. northeast, midwest, southern California, etc.).
And of course, some REITs are diversified as to both property type and
geographical location. REIT investors can simply pick and choose which
types of REITs they want to invest in. To achieve any degree of
diversification in private ownership of commercial real estate, an investor
must have an incredible amount of capital. One property alone can cost
millions of dollars.
f) Performance monitoring by the REIT's independent directors, analysts,
auditors, and the financial news media provides investors with up to date
information on the REITs financial condition. Often in private real estate
it is too late to do anything by the time this information is made available.
g) REITs have performed well as long term investments. NAREIT officers
prefer to emphasize the performance of REITs over the last ten years,
which averaged an annual return of more than 15 percent.5 Other
studies of REITs over short periods have differing conclusions about the
performance of REITs depending upon the time period studied.
However, a study of the long term performance of REITs indicated that
"the performance of REIT portfolios (which included all types of REITs)
was consistent with the security market line for the 1970-1989 period. In
other works, REITs are not 'inferior' investment vehicles."6 This study
noted further that "In general, the equity REIT portfolios performed much
better than the mortgage REIT portfolios." 7 Therefore, it might be
reasonable to infer that equity REIT portfolios have been "superior" long
term investment vehicles. Looking forward, there is certainly no reason
to consider them "inferior" investments.
5McCann, p.19.
6Jun Han, "The Historical Performance of Real Estate
Investment Trusts, " Working Paper, #38, M.I.T. Center for Real
Estate, November, November, 1991, p.4.
7 Ibid., p.24.
h) REIT stocks are less volatile than the market portfolio. The sample of
REITs in the Value Line Investment Survey have a beta between .4 and
.8.8 This means that if the overall stock market dropped 10 percent in
value, the REIT would only drop between 4 and 8 percent in value.
i) The REIT investor's liability is limited to the amount of money invested
in the particular REIT. If a disaster occurs at one of the REIT's
properties, financial compensation for damages can only be taken from
the REIT's assets, not the personal assets of the shareholder. This
same protection is not always available in private ownership of real
estate.
1.5 Limitations of the REIT Structure
Most of the limitations which are described in this section apply to
investment in REITs by large shareholders, such as wealthy individuals, mutual
funds, or pension funds.9
a) The REIT industry has a relatively small market capitalization. The
market capitalization of all equity REITs is around $20 billion. The total
of all pension fund assets are estimated at $2.5 trillion. Pension funds
8Robert Belzer, The Value Line Investment Survey, Part 3,
Ratings & Reports, Vol. XLVIII, No. 34, May 7, 1993, pp.1172-1183.
9Lecander, pp.6,7,53.
allocate approximately 5 percent of their assets to real estate, or about
$125 billion. Even if REIT offerings continue at the extraordinary pace of
$5 to $10 billion a year, it will take at least a decade to build a supply of
shares large enough just to satisfy pension funds.
b) Lack of diversification opportunities may be a problem for large
investors. During times when certain property types are not attractive
investments, such as hotels and office buildings are now, these types of
properties will become under-represented in the REIT industry. New
issues will come primarily from the strongest sectors of the real estate
industry. In fact, 85 percent of the new offerings studied in this paper
were from the retail and residential sectors. Without a strong
representation of all property types and geographic regions,
diversification within the REIT industry may be difficult.
c) Lack of liquidity may be a problem for large shareholders due to limited
trading volume. On a typical day only about 2 percent of the outstanding
shares of a REIT are traded.'0 If, for example, a pension fund owned
10 percent of a REIT's shares, it would be difficult, if not impossible to
sell off a large portion without forcing the share price down to bargain
levels. The pension fund would have to try to negotiate a swap or sale
i 0 "New York Stock Exchange Composite Transactions", The Wall
Street Journal, June, 1993.
with another large investor, or sell off small blocks of their shares in the
public market over a longer period of time.
d) REIT stocks may have lower expected returns than privately owned
real estate, due to the fact that privately owned real estate is less liquid
than publicly owned REIT stocks. If a pension fund can expect a higher
return on its direct investment in real estate, after taking management
fees and expenses into consideration, than from a REIT, the pension
fund may feel that it would be better to retain their in-house real estate
management staff. If, however, the cost of the in-house staff is equal to
or greater than the difference in returns between the two investment
options, the more liquid REIT stocks might be a better choice.
e) A REIT portfolio may include lower quality properties. These
properties may have been acquired before or after the REIT was
created. For any number of reasons such as changing regional
economics, failure of a major tenant, or unforeseen environmental
conditions, the investment may have gone bad. In any event, the
shareholder is stuck with the lower quality properties until they are either
disposed of, or expenses are incurred to improve their condition.
1.6 The Place for REITs in a Pension Fund Portfolio
Pension consultants seem to be in agreement that REITs are not the
same as direct investment in real estate when it comes to a pension fund's
multi-asset class portfolio." A multi-asset class portfolio might include equities
(stocks), fixed income (bonds), real assets (real estate, timberland, oil and gas,
others), and high yield securities (corporate and junk bonds). The consultants
argue that investments in REITs should be implemented through the pension's
equity investment manager rather than its real estate manager. In fact, three,
five, and ten year studies show that the NAREIT equity REIT index is 94, 85,
and 93 percent respectively correlated with the three, five, and ten year
performance of the Russell 2000 small cap stock index, and only -24, 3, and -
23 percent correlated with the Russell/NCREIF property index (portfolio of
institutionally owned properties)." Based upon this evidence, the consultants
argue that REITs should not be included in the pension portfolio as a proxy for
direct investment in real estate. They further explain that inclusion of REITs in
the pension portfolio simply has the effect of "doubling down" on REIT stocks.
Since equity investing by pensions is often indexed, REITs are already included
in their portfolio. The pension fund's reason for investing in "real estate" to
"Primary references include: Richard M. Ennis, "Investment
Policy Considerations in Making a Pension Allocation to Real
Estate," (Unpublished), May 10, 1993; Nori Gerardo, "REITs: No
Substitute for Private Real Estate, " PREA Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2,
April, 1993, pp.32-36; and Lecander, "Real Estate Securities in a
Pension Fund Investment Program" .
"Gerardo, p. 3 3 .
begin with is to increase portfolio diversification. The consultants argue that
replacing direct investment with REITs will eliminate the real estate
diversification effect, and consequently reduce the overall diversification of the
portfolio. Substituting REITs for direct investment would therefore remove real
estate from the "real asset" class of the multi-asset class portfolio, and move it
to the "equities" class as an industry.
There may, however, be some error in the methodology of this
comparison. For instance, the properties in the Russell/NCREIF property index
are only appraised once a year, while REITs and other stocks are priced
continuously. We will refer to this as a deficiency in appraisal data. This
deficiency, coupled with appraisal bias, as described in section 1.4d, leads to a
"smoothing" of values of the Russell/NCREIF index. If it were not cost-
prohibitive to appraise the properties on a daily basis, the correlations reported
above might be quite different. Would a property acquired by a REIT from the
Russell/NCREIF portfolio suddenly acquire different investment characteristics?
Since it is in fact the same property, it is unlikely that this would happen.
Taking a different perspective, one might refer to the 2-4 year lags,
which are often cited, of the Russell/NCREIF property index to the stock
market. If pension funds are long term investors, then does such a relatively
short term lag have an appreciable effect on the pension fund's entire portfolio?
Again, it seems unlikely.
1.7 Prior Research on the Performance of REITs
A number of studies have been done comparing the performance of
REITs over time to other investment vehicles including stock indexes, bonds,
property indexes, etc. The primary objective of this paper is to study the
performance and characteristics of equity REIT IPOs during the period of 1991-
1993.13
1.8 What Does the Future Hold for REITs?
The REIT industry will have its ups and downs as every industry does.
REITs are currently enjoying a boom both in initial and secondary public
offerings. One of the primary reasons for the current boom is that REITs offer
a more attractive yield than is currently available from other types of
investments. Paul Pearson of Kidder Peabody warns however that "the
challenge is to start educating investment dollars that REITs are not a pure
interest rate play. As interest rates increase we do not want the excitement of
REITs to decline."' 4
Another major reason for the current boom in REITs is the current real
estate liquidity crisis. Banks, life insurance companies, pension funds, and
"For more information on the historical performance of REITs
contact NAREIT at the address and telephone provided earlier, or
call M.I.T.'s Center for Real Estate at 617-253-4373 and ask for a
copy of Jun Han's working paper WP #38 published in November, 1991.
"Comments made by Paul Pearson of Kidder Peabody, Inc., a
panelist at the "REIT Formation Workshop" in Boston, April 21,
1993.
foreign investors have all suffered heavy financial losses in real estate over the
past few years and have essentially halted further investments in U.S. real
estate. Existing REITs, which have usually been conservatively leveraged,
have been able to acquire good properties at low costs from distressed
sellers."5
REITs are also being used as a refinancing strategy for property owners
looking to get out from under a pile of debt. Rather than sell in the private
market at a 10 or 11 percent capitalization rate, they are taking their portfolios
public through a REIT at a 7 or 8 percent capitalization rate. Real estate
values are derived by dividing the net operating income (NOI) by the required
return (capitalization rate). This means that the real estate will be valued higher
in the public markets. For example, if the NOI of a property was $2,000,000
the value derived in the private markets in order to receive a return of 10
percent would be $2,000,000/.1 which equals $20,000,000. In the public
markets, however, investors are willing to accept a return of 7 percent, which
results in a derived value of $2,000,000/.07 or $28,571,429. For a large
portfolio this could amount to tens of millions of dollars, which, after an IPO
could be used to reduce debt, renovate properties, acquire new properties, etc.
NOI should not be confused with Funds From Operation (FFO). FFO is
the performance measure for equity REITs. It is defined by NAREIT as follows:
isMcCann, p.9.
Funds From Operations means net income (computed in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles)
excluding gains (or losses) from debt restructuring and sales of
property plus depreciation and amortization, and after adjustments
for unconsolidated partnerships and joint ventures. Adjustments
for unconsolidated partnerships and joint ventures will be
calculated to reflect funds from operations on the same basis.
Fred Carr and John Pattillo of the Penobscot Group, an investment
advisory firm in Boston, MA, offered some insights on the outlook of the REIT
industry.. They see many REITs growing in size by merging with or acquiring
other REITs with "sleepy management", most likely older REITs. "By more
aggressively managing the properties there could be an immediate 20 percent
increase in the value of the properties."
Barry Greenfield, Fidelity's real estate mutual fund manager, feels that
the current REIT boom will continue for some time. He said, "We're in the
second inning of a nine inning game...."16
The manager of a syndicate desk at Merrill Lynch, one of the leading
underwriter's of REIT offerings, also feels that REITs will continue to be a hot
item with investors. He commented, "We're about one third of the way through
the boom, due for a correction in prices (downward), but in the long term REITs
will be successful."
From the evidence presented, it appears that the REITs will play an
important role in the securities industry for at least the foreseeable future.
1 6Barry Vinocor, "REIT Shares Take Some Lumps, " Barron's, Vol.
73, No. 18, May 3, 1993, p.48.
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1.9 NAREIT
The National Association for Real Estate Investment Trusts, Inc. is a not
for profit organization. Its duties include:
educating potential REIT managers, investors, advisors, lawyers, etc.
about the REIT industry through seminars and publications.
representing the REIT industry in discussions and lobbying efforts with
the government.
Keeping members informed of the latest developments within the
industry.
Most recently NAREIT has been working to eliminate the "five or fewer" rule
and to pass legislation which would make it easier for partnerships to convert to
REITs without incurring a capital gains tax on the transaction. It appears as
though congress will pass these laws sometime in the near future, making
REITs an even more attractive real estate investment vehicle.
CHAPTER 2 - IPOs
2.1 Basics of the IPO Process17
When a company decides to "go public," it issues shares of common
stock for sale to the general public for the first time. This is called the initial
public offering (IPO). There are a number of decisions which the issuing
company must make that will affect the success of its IPO.
First, the company must choose an underwriter to guide it through the
IPO process." The underwriter's knowledge of the industry in which the
company is involved, its reputation as an underwriter, its size, and its ability to
sell shares, are all important factors for the company to consider when
choosing an underwriter. Often two or more underwriters are chosen to co-
manage the IPO, with one being designated as the lead underwriter. The
underwriter's duties can be summed up as follows, "first they provide the
company with procedural and financial advice, then they buy the issue, and
finally they resell it to the public."19
"Primary references include: Richard A. Brealey and Stewart
C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, Fourth Edition, McGraw-
Hill, Inc., New York, N.Y., 1991, pp.343-354; and Richard Wurman,
Alan Siegel, and Kenneth Morris, The Wall Street Journal Guide to
Understanding Money & Markets, Accesspress Ltd., and Siegel & Gale,
Inc., New York, N.Y., 1990, p.8.
1 8Technically a company can underwrite the IPO itself. With
the exception of an investment bank, however, a large company will
probably not have the knowledge of the SEC filing process and the
investor relations to successfully self-underwrite the IPO.
19Brealy and Myers, p. 3 4 3 .
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After an underwriter is chosen, the next several weeks, or months if
necessary, are spent gathering and analyzing information about the issuing
company. Eventually a registration statement is filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) describing the company, its history, its business
plans, etc. A preliminary prospectus, or red herring, is prepared as part of the
registration statement, and distributed to all interested investors.
While waiting for the SEC's final approval of the registration statement,
the company and the underwriters embark on a series of road shows, making
presentations to institutional investors, while attempting to get a feel for interest
in the issue. During these road shows, only information provided in the
prospectus may be discussed or referred to, otherwise an amendment must be
filed with the SEC and distributed to everyone who received the red herring.
After reviewing the registration statement, the SEC may request
additional or modified information. If this is the case an amended statement is
filed with the SEC and a final prospectus is printed and distributed.
The final prospectus will be slightly different than the red herring. It will
incorporate the changes required by the SEC and it will include the offering
price, the underwriting discount, and other pertinent information as described
below.
The offering price is determined by negotiations between the issuing
company and the underwriter. Many studies have been done on how this price
is actually determined. These studies will be discussed later in this chapter. In
general, however, the offering price depends upon the current economy, prices
of "comparable companies"' stock, and demand for the issue by investors.
After determining the offering price, the company and the underwriters
negotiate the underwriting discount, or spread. This is the profit per share
that the underwriter will earn. If the offering price is $22.50, and the
underwriting discount is $1.50, the net proceeds to the issuing company would
be $21.00 per share.
There are two types of underwriting contracts. In a firm commitment
contract the underwriter is obligated to purchase all of the shares being offered,
at the offering price less the underwriting discount. In the example above, if 5
million shares are being offered, the issuing company would receive a check
from the underwriter for $105 million (less certain other allowed expenses).
With a best efforts contract, the proceeds of the sale would be held in escrow
until a predetermined number of shares are sold. If the required number of
shares are not sold within a specified time period, the issue is called off and the
investors' money is returned to them. Throughout the remainder of this paper I
will be referring to firm commitment contracts, unless noted otherwise. As we
will see, this is the type chosen by most companies of significant size.
The final item to be determined is the over-allotment option, or "green
shoe". The issuing company may give the underwriter the option to purchase
up to an additional 15 percent of the number of shares being offered (i.e.
750,000 additional shares in the example above). These may be purchased at
24
the original offering price, within a specified time frame, for purposes of
"stabilizing the price."
Many studies have examined the issues and motives behind the pricing
of the stock, the spreads, over-allotment options, etc. These theories and
studies will be discussed throughout the remainder of this chapter.
2.2 Theories About IPOs
2.2.1 Costs of Going Public
There are both direct costs and indirect costs associated with an IPO.
Direct costs can be determined with much more certainty than indirect costs.
The direct costs of an IPO include the underwriting discount, legal expenses,
accounting fees, printing costs, road show costs, and other miscellaneous
expenses. A fairly accurate dollar value can be affixed to these direct costs.
Indirect costs, on the other hand, are much more difficult to determine with
precision. They primarily include the cost of "underpricing" an issue.
Underpricing can be thought of as the difference between what the initial
offering price should have been to provide the greatest benefit to the issuing
company, and what it actually was. Studies on this topic have looked at the
difference between the closing price of the stock on the first day of trading, and
the original offering price. This is referred to as the initial return. Some
researchers argue that there must be some degree of underpricing to provide
an incentive for investors to buy the IPO stock, otherwise investors would buy
25
only "seasoned" stocks (those which have been trading for some time) whose
values are already known. Others argue that there should be no underpricing
at all. Nonetheless, one study of IPOs from 1977-1982 (Ritter's study) reports
that the average underpricing was 14.8 percent. This same study estimates
direct costs as $250,000 + 7 percent of the gross proceeds of the issue. The
study also estimates total transaction costs as 21.22 percent of the gross
proceeds. 20 Another study of IPOs from 1960-1987 (lbbotson's study)
indicates average underpricing of 16.4 percent of gross proceeds.
These underpricing costs can amount to millions of dollars per IPO. It is
no wonder then, that underpricing has been and continues to be researched so
extensively. Several theories about why underpricing occurs will now be
described.
2.2.2 Asymmetry of Information
Probably the most often cited study on this theory is that of Kevin
Rock.22 His theory states that there are two types of investors. Some
investors are "uninformed" while others are "informed". To become informed
one must incur a substantial cost. However, an informed investor knows which
2 Jay R. Ritter, "The Costs of Going Public," Journal of
Financial Economics, Vol. 19, 1987, pp.272-273.
"R.G. Ibbotson, J.C. Sindelar, and J.R. Ritter, "Initial
Public Offerings," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Summer,
1988.
2 2Kevin Rock, "Why New Issues Are Underpriced, " Journal of
Financial Economics, Vol. 15, March, 1986, pp.187-212.
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IPOs are "good" (underpriced) and which ones are not. Informed investors will
therefore only want to buy shares of the good IPOs. Furthermore, since the
cost to become informed is substantial, only wealthy individuals or institutional
investors can bear that cost. That means that the uninformed group consists of
less wealthy, retail investors.
The theory argues that when informed investors know an issue is
underpriced, they will place large orders for shares of that issue, resulting in an
over-subscribed issue. In this case the underwriters have to decide how they
will allocate the number of shares being offered. Since the large institutional
clients generate a lot of business for the underwriters, they are the underwriter's
preferred customers. They will tend to get most or all of the shares they have
asked for. Small and uninformed investors, on the other hand, will get only a
fraction, if any, of the good shares they order.
In the case when an issue is not underpriced, institutional investors will
order few, if any shares. Small investors do not know that it is a "bad" issue,
so they continue to place their usual order. This time the small investors will
get all of the shares they asked for. This is known as the "winner's curse". If
you win the shares, something must be wrong. Needless to say, the small
investor will "win" more bad shares than good shares so on average their return
will be lower than that of the institutional investor.
The theory has two other important assumptions. The first is that
wealthy investors cannot buy up all of the shares of an IPO. The second is that
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uninformed investors are rational and intelligent. These assumptions imply that
uninformed investors recognize their disadvantage, and know that they will
receive a disproportionate number of bad shares. In order for underwriters to
keep the uninformed investors in the IPO buying game, they will have to
allocate some of the good shares to them. The theory concludes that in order
to attract the uninformed investors, the IPO must be underpriced to compensate
them for the disproportionate number of overpriced shares they receive. The
equilibrium level of underpricing, it says, is that which will just guarantee full
subscription to the issue.
A recent article seems to confirm Rock's theory. The article explains
that SEC rules prohibiting any written material about an offering other than that
provided in the prospectus, create a disadvantage for retail investors. A former
SEC commissioner states that "the laws and regulations are very well-
intentioned, designed to prevent fraud and abuse, but they do chill the flow of
useful and valuable information; they prevent information from getting out there
to the retail investor."24 The laws also apply to non-written information such
as overly optimistic or pessimistic verbal projections of a company's future. If
the projections are not consistent with the information provided in the
prospectus, they are prohibited. It is unlikely that the prospectus will contain
such projections, since the issuing company and underwriter could be subject to
23Tom Pratt, "The IPO Information Gap, " Investment Dealers'
Digest, Vol. 58, No. 20, May 18, 1992, pp.14-18.
24Ibid., p.14.
lawsuits if the projections don't pan out. The article maintains that "All Street
firms still routinely provide estimates, and help with earnings models, to their
largest institutional clients ...firms simply don't have the option of not providing
help with estimates if they want the big players to participate in an IPO... retail
investors simply don't receive as much information."2"
Two possible solutions are suggested in the article: either crack down
on the oral information, or modify the laws. The first solution would be difficult
to implement. The second might be worth considering.
2.2.3 Underwriters' Reputation and Prestige
Most empirical studies conclude that prestigious underwriters underprice
less.26 That is, so-called prestigious investment banking firms more accurately
price IPOs than less prestigious firms. In these studies prestigious underwriters
are those with either a large capital base, the highest number of IPOs issued,
the largest dollar volume of IPOs issued, or some combination of the above.
The important point is that these firms do not want to taint their reputation with
either clients or investors, and therefore they price IPOs more accurately. One
study concluded, "Prestigious underwriters, to maintain their reputations, only
2 sIbid., p.17.
2 6James M. Johnson and Robert E. Miller, "Investment Banking
Prestige and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings,"
Financial Management, Summer, 1988, p. 2 0 .
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market IPOs of low dispersion firms."27 In other words, prestigious
underwriters pick and choose which firms they will take public, reducing the
chance that one of their IPOs will fail. The corollary to this is that in order for
an issuing company to appear less risky so that it will attract more investors in
an IPO, it will be willing to underprice an issue in order to be able to work with
a prestigious underwriter. There is also the case of the company that knows it
is a low risk firm, and in order to convey that fact to the investment community,
it contracts with a prestigious underwriter.2"
Another study on this theory takes a different view, concluding that "both
sides of the IPO market are in equilibrium: issuers have no incentive to favor
high prestige underwriters, and investors have no incentive to favor issues
offered by low prestige bankers."2 9 It argues that any savings for an issuer in
terms of underpricing will be offset by higher underwriting fees and discounts.
Also, a higher expected return to investors is a tradeoff with higher uncertainty
of the true value of the issuing firm.
2
"Richard B. Carter and Steven Manaster, "Initial Public
Offerings and Underwriter Reputation, " Journal of Finance, Vol. 45,
No. 4, September, 1990, p. 1 0 62 .
2 8Ibid., p. 1050.
2 9Johnson and Miller, p.20.
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2.2.4 Signaling
One signaling theory states that issuing companies which plan to come
back to the market with a secondary offering sometime in the near future, want
to leave a "good taste" in the investor's mouth so they underprice the IPO.30
Variations of this theory imply that "firms that underprice more will
experience a more positive market reaction (i.e. rise in stock price) to a
dividend increase than firms that do not underprice."3 In other words, by
underpricing the IPO, the issuer hopes to signal to investors through higher
dividends and dividend yields later, that the value of the firm is high, resulting in
an increase in the price of the stock.
Another variation of the signaling theory implies that the greater the
underpricing and the higher the percentage of shares held by "insiders" (i.e. the
issuing firm's management and employees), the more highly valued the stock
will become later. 2 The higher percentage held by insiders implies that
management's objectives are more closely aligned with those of the
shareholders.
3 Roni Michaely and Wayne H. Shaw, "The Pricing of Initial
Public Offerings: Tests of the Adverse Selection and Signalling
Theories," (Unpublished), April 28, 1993, p. 2 6 .
"Ibid., p.22.
1 2 Ibid., p.29.
2.2.5 "Hot Markets"
Some researchers argue that at certain times investors are more hungry
for IPOs than at other times. In other words, they are willing to accept less of a
return on new issues, so new issues are underpriced less. As a recent article
stated, "It stands to reason. When the market is high and demand for new
issues is insatiable, underwriters reach down into the bottom of the barrel for
material, and they price it richly. But when no one wants to buy stocks, the
dealmakers offer only their best candidates, and offer them at attractive prices
(by underpricing)."33 In other words the theory says that IPOs are priced
higher during periods of heavy IPO activity, resulting in higher net proceeds to
the issuing firm.
A recent study agrees. It explains that issuing firms try to time their
offerings to coincide with periods of heavy IPO activity. In doing so, it argues,
issuing firms can reduce their cost of capital, which includes underpricing costs,
by 8 percent, to an average of 12 percent. In other words, by timing the IPO to
coincide with periods of heavy IPO activity, the total costs of going public,
including underpricing and direct costs, can be reduced by up to 8 percent.
This is because investors are willing to pay more for the IPO shares, which
results in less underpricing of the issue.4 The issuing company benefits at
3 3Warren Midgett and Scott DeCarlo, "New Issues Roulette,"
Forbes, Vol. 149, No. 2, Summer, 1992, p.160.
14Tim Loughran and Jay R. Ritter, "The Timing and Subsequent
Performance of IPOs: The U.S. and International Evidence,"
(Unpublished), April 6, 1993, pp.1-27.
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the expense of the investor.
The advice offered by these researchers is obvious; invest only in IPOs
issued during years of slow IPO activity.
2.2.6 Other Underpricing Theories
It would be impossible to describe and differentiate all of the studies
performed on IPO underpricing, so I will conclude by mentioning just a few
more:
- The publicity generated about an underpriced issue will lead to an
increase in the stock price in the aftermarket, which is in the best interest
of the issuing firm.35
- Investment bankers have bargaining power over issuing companies,
particularly smaller ones, so they pressure them to underprice the
IPO. 36
- Underpricing is a form of insurance for issuing companies and
underwriters against the possibility of lawsuits arising out of a poorly
performing IPO.37
3sThomas J. Chemmanur, "The Pricing
Offerings: A Dynamic Model With Information
of Finance, Vol. 48, No. 1, March, 1993, pp.
36Seha M. Tir
Stock, " Journal
pp.791.
of Initial Public
Production," Journal
285-304.
"Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common
of Finance, Vol. XLIII, No. 4, September, 1988,
7Tbid., p.818.
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The theories presented above have been studied by a number of
researchers. In many cases the results of the studies contradict each other.
This usually occurs when the sampling constraints differ such as with the time
period studied, the size of the issues, the industries included in the sample, etc.
Perhaps there is not just one simple answer. In any event it is likely that the
research and the debates will continue, and it will be up to the reader to decide
which theories to believe.
2.3 The Over-Allotment Option
SEC rules permit an issuing company to allow the underwriter to
purchase up to an additional 15 percent of the number of registered shares of
an IPO, as the over-allotment option. This option is also referred to as the
"green shoe", named after the Green Shoe Company (now called Stride-Rite)
who was the first issuer ever to use the over-allotment option."
The purpose of the over-allotment option is to help the underwriter
stabilize the price of the stock, preventing heavy losses to the underwriter in
cases where the stock price drops shortly after it starts trading.39 Price
stabilization works like this: During the months after the red herring is
3 8Frank A. Klepetko and David A. Krinsky, "Raising Equity
Capital - Untying the Knots in the Green Shoe, " Journal of Business
Strategy, Vol. 12, No. 4, p.57.
3 9judith S. Ruud, "Another View of Underpricing of Initial
Public Offerings," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly
Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring, 1991, pp.83.
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distributed and prior to the commencement of trading, the underwriters get
tentative orders for the stock from prospective investors. As the offering date
approaches, a final offering price is determined, causing some investors to
reconsider and cancel their orders. To protect themselves from a large number
of canceled orders (remember, the underwriter is obligated to purchase all of
the shares in an offering), and the possibility that a large number of shares will
be dumped back in their lap shortly after trading starts, the underwriter will
commit to selling more shares than are actually being offered. This creates a
"short" position for the underwriter. If the stock price drops after trading starts,
the underwriter will not have to exercise the over-allotment option. It can simply
buy back shares in the open market at or below the original offering price. If
the price rises in the aftermarket, the underwriter can cover the short position
by exercising the green shoe option. Without a green shoe, the underwriter
would have to cover its short position by buying shares in the open market at
higher prices.4
Some researchers argue that the over-allotment option creates and
incentive for the underwriter to excessively underprice the issue.41
Nonetheless, the SEC allows this method of price stabilization provided that it is
disclosed in the prospectus. In fact, most prospectuses contain the clause, "In
4 0Richard B. Carter and Frederick H. Dark, "The Use of the
Over-Allotment Option in Initial Public Offerings of Equity: Risks
and Underwriter Prestige," Financial Management, Vol. 19, No. 3,
Autumn, 1990, pp. 56.
41Tbid., p.56.
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connection with this offering, the underwriters may effect transactions which
stabilize or maintain the market price of the common stock of the company at a
level above that which might otherwise prevail in the open market. Such
stabilization, if commenced, may be discontinued at any time." 42
One study concluded that underwriters exercised 83.71 percent of the
optionable shares,43 while another reported that "66% of firm commitment
offerings in 1983-1987 exercised over-allotment options."44 Another points out
that the green shoe is good for an underwriter's relationship with its investors
because the investor can get a larger percentage of its original order for good
shares filled. 45 Note also, that since the green shoe will almost always be
exercised when the stock price increases above the IPO price (i.e. when
underpricing has occurred), then exercising the option to buy more shares
further increases the cost of underpricing to the issuer. One final study
concluded that "both the issuer and the underwriter stand to benefit from the
exercise of the Green Shoe,..."46 primarily due to the benefits of economies of
scale from the increased number of shares sold.
42Ruud, p.83.
4 3Chris J. Muscarella, John W. Peavy III, and Michael R.
Vetsuypens, "Optimal Exercise of the Over-Allotment Option in
IPOs," Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 48, No. 3, May/June, 1992,
p.80.
4 4 Loughran and Ritter, p.12 (refers to a 1992 study by Hanley)
4 5Carter and Dark, p.57.
46Klepetko and Krinsky, p.58.
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2.4 Underwriting Discounts
The difference between the IPO offering price and the price at which the
underwriter buys each share from the issuing company is called the discount. It
is also referred to as the spread. It represents the commission which the
underwriter will earn for each share sold. The discount is shown on the front
page of the prospectus. Since every penny of a discount represents a penny
per share that the issuing company will not receive and vice versa, it is no
wonder that heated discussions can arise while negotiating the amount of the
discount. When Microsoft went public in 1986 each penny represented
$31,000. The underwriter argued that it deserved a healthy compensation for
its extraordinary marketing effort. The company knew what a recent competitor
gave its underwriter and felt that Microsoft's discount should be lower since it
was a much less risky firm.47
Size of the issue, riskiness of the firm, quality of the underwriter, and
recent transactions will all come into play during the negotiation of the spread.
2.5 "Flippers"
Investors who make a practice of buying shares of IPOs and selling them
for a quick profit shortly after trading commences, are known as flippers. In an
effort to minimize flipping, underwriters have begun to penalize brokers for
selling to flippers. The contract with the broker will state that commissions will
47Bro Uttal, "Inside the Deal That Made Bill Gates
$350,000,000." , Fortune, July 21, 1986, pp.32-33.
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not be paid for shares sold to flippers if the flipper sells the shares back to the
underwriting syndicate. There are two reasons why underwriters want to
minimize flipping. First, flipping creates a lot of price fluctuation while
underwriters are trying to stabilize the price. Second, underwriters do not want
to have to buy back all of the shares that flippers will dump back on them. This
dumping would cause the stock price to fall. The underwriter would then own a
lot of low priced stock.48 The penalty for selling to flippers "may be in force for
five trading days, although some have stretched out over an amazing 30
days."4
As the head of an equity syndicate desk at Merrill Lynch explained, "It is
easy to identify the flippers. If I see that an investor no longer owns any of the
50,000 shares of XYZ stock that we sold him last week, then I am not going to
sell him 50,000 shares of the stock he wants today. I can also look at the
attendance records of the road show presentations. An investor who never
showed up is obviously not interested in the long term performance of the
stock." He did admit, however, that an investor who buys often and in large
quantities (i.e. institutional investors) will receive preferential treatment when
shares are allocated. Flippers, on the other hand, are not stupid either. They
instruct their brokers not to sell their shares to members of the underwriting
4 8Thomas N. Cochran, "Year of the IPO: New Stock Offerings Set
a Record in 1992, " Barron's, Vol. 73, No. 1, January 4, 1993, p.21.
4 9Anthony J. Correra, "Boick That Sale: War On IPO Flippers
Hurts Little Guy," Barron's, Vol.72, No. 22, June 1, 1992, p.43.
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syndicate.
2.6 The Current IPO Boom (1991-1993)
The slow pace of IPOs in the first quarter of 1991, if it continued, would
have resulted in the worst year for IPOs in a decade. However, things picked
up during the second quarter and throughout the remainder of the year at such
an amazing pace that the $24.8 billion raised by IPOs in 1991 was the highest
total ever by over $500,000,000.50 As 1992 progressed, underwriters became
cautious about the quality of firms going public. William Paternotte, director of
research at Alex Brown & Sons, the leading underwriter of IPOs for 1991 with
almost $6 billion raised, stated "We want analysts to screen out companies that
are not good long term investments."51 This supports the reputation theory,
but contradicts the comment that underwriters "pull material out from the bottom
of the barrel".
During the last quarter of 1992, several articles were written which
showed optimism for a continued IPO boom. These articles cited selectivity by
underwriters and reasonable pricing of the IPOs as the reasons for their
optimism.52 Total capital raised by IPOs in 1992 established a new record at
5 Robert A. Mamis, "Inc. 100: The Year in IPOs, " Inc., Vol. 14,
No. 5, May, 1992, p.134.
s 1Debbie Galant, "Going Public," Institutional Investor, Vol.
26, No. 4, April, 1992, p. 1 2 7 .
52Keith Goggin, "IPO Blowouts Are Back Again AS Investors Pay
for Quality," Investment Dealers' Digest, Vol. 58, No. 39,
September 28, 1992, and Keith Goggin, "The Weather's Getting Colder
39
Merrill Lynch was the leading IPO underwriter for the year with
almost $7.9 billion raised."
The boom has continued so far during 1993. In the first quarter alone
IPOs raised $11.5 billion,54 and the total increased to $25 billion by the end of
the first half.55 If the pace keeps up new records will be set in 1993.
2.7 Closing Comments On IPOs
The theories have been presented and the market has been described.
Perhaps the best way to judge the success of an IPO is to ask the issuing
companies for their opinions. So how satisfied are the issuing firms with the
work done by the underwriters they chose? Well, here are the results of a
survey of firms that went public during 1992:56
But IPOs Are Getting Hotter,"
No. 49, December 7, 1992, p.1
53Keith Goggin,
Paid. .., " Investment
1993, p. 2 4 .
"Wall Street Get
Dealers' Digest,
Vol. 58,
s Paid. ... and paid ... and
Vol.59, No. 6, February 8,
54Thomas N. Cochran, "IPOs Everywhere: New Issues Hit A Record
in the First Quarter, " Barron's, Vol. 73, No. 16, April 19, 1993,
p. 14.
ssSara Calian,
in Second Half of
p.Cl.
56Tom Pratt,
IPOs," Investment
1993, p. 1 4 .
"Analysts Expect Sizzling IPO Pace to Continue
1993," The Wall Street Journal,
"Survey Says Most
Dealer's Digest,
Issuers Satisfied
June 28, 1993,
With 1992
Vol. 59, No. 3, January 18,
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Investment Dealers' Digest,
$39.9 billion.
How would you rate your underwriter's performance?
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
51%
40%
9%
0%
Would you use the same underwriter to manage a second deal?
Yes
No
Undecided
Rate the quantit
after the IPO.
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
Rate the quality
after the IPO.
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
y of research coverage by your lead investment banker
18%
42%
22%
18%
of research coverage by your lead investment banker
29%
49%
7%
15%
Rate the extent of research coverage by other firms.
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
10%
31%
27%
31%
It appears as though the underwriters have passed the test for the 1992
boom. The factors that were named the most important by issuing firms in
75%
14%
11%
choosing an underwriter included 1) establishing a personal relationship, 2)
industry expertise, and 3) the track record of other IPOs.57
5 7Ibid., p. 1 4 .
Chapter 3 - Equity REIT IPOs, 1991-1993
3.1 Lack of Previous Research
In this chapter evidence is presented which demonstrates that we are in
the midst of an equity REIT IPO boom period. Research on equity REIT IPOs
would be extremely valuable for companies considering going public, as well as
potential investors in a new offering. I was amazed to discover that not much
research has been performed on this topic. In fact, the only information I found
was a reference to a study of 87 REIT IPOs for which the average initial return
was -2.82 percent.58 It is not stated whether this sample included equity,
mortgage, and/or hybrid REITs. Furthermore, it is not clear as to the time
period covered by the study.
In chapter two I described a number of studies on IPOs in general. One
might think that these studies would be somewhat useful as a proxy for
research on equity REIT IPOs. However, all of the studies which I referenced
either specifically excluded REITs from their sample, or did not mention whether
or not they were included. Because of their exclusion, one might surmise that
those researchers feel that REITs behave differently than other IPOs. That is
what we will try to determine in this chapter.
5 8Michaely and Shaw, pp.15-16.
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3.2 Sample Data
With the help of a REIT analyst at the investment management firm of
Cohen & Steers, I obtained copies of prospectuses for "all equity REIT IPOs
from 1991 to 1993." I recognize that there may be some sampling bias toward
institutional grade equity REIT IPOs given the source of sample data. I would
argue, however, that including just these types of equity REIT IPOs will make
this study much more meaningful. In section 3.4 we see that these are
essentially the only types of REIT IPOs that investors and underwriters are
interested in at this time.
The sample consists of the 13 firms listed below. (Note that Vornado,
Inc. was excluded because it was already a publicly traded real estate company
prior to converting to a REIT. Healthcare REITs are also excluded.)
Sample of Equity REIT IPOs
Company Date of IPO
Kimco Realty Corporation 11/22/91
Kranzco Realty Trust 11/12/92
Taubman Centers, Inc. 11/20/92
Wellsford Residential Property Trust 11/20/92
Developer's Diversified Realty Corp. 02/02/93
Carr Realty Corp. 02/09/93
Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. 02/25/93
General Growth Properties, Inc. 04/07/93
Marks Centers Trust 05/26/93
TriNet Corporate Realty Trust, Inc. 05/26/93
Tanger Factory Outlet Centers, Inc. 05/27/93
Factory Stores of America, Inc. 06/03/93
Holly Residential Properties, Inc. 06/11/93
Analyses were performed on information provided in the prospectuses,
the "New York Stock Exchange Composite Transaction" section of The Wall
Street Joumal, and the NYSE Daily Stock Price Record, published by Standard
& Poors, Inc. (Appendix A lists the daily trading information obtained about
each company from the NYSE sources). Results are compared to those of
previous IPO studies as referenced in chapter two.
3.3 Analysis and Observations
3.3.1 Costs
Exhibit 3.1 is a summary of selected information provided in the
prospectuses. Several comparisons can be made between this exhibit and
Ritter's study of IPOs from 1977-1982 (see Exhibit 3.2)"9
Ritter's study divides the sample into five ranges of gross proceeds
(size of IPO assuming no exercise of over-allotment option); $100,000-
$1,999,999; $2,000,000-$3,999,999; $4,000,000-$5,999,999; $6,000,000-
$9,999,999; and $10,000,000-$120,174,195. In our study the range of gross
proceeds is $87,000,000-$363,000,000. The average size of an IPO in our
study is $160,217,308, which is substantially larger than the upper range of
Ritter's study. Compare this as well to the average size of an IPO in lbbotson's
study which was less than $10 million even after excluding the smallest 2,000
or so IPOs valued at less than
5 9 Ritter, pp.272-273.
Exhibit 3.1
COMPANY Underwriter # shares Green IPO Div. Gross Underwriter Con- Re- Estimated Advisory Property
issued Shoe Price Yield Proceeds Discount cession Allowance Expenses Fee Type
Kimco Merrill Lynch 6,400,000 960,000 $20.00 8.8% $128,000,000 $1.30 $0.78 $0.10 $3,105,000 $600,000 Shopping Center
Smith Barney 15.00% 6.50% 3.90% 0.50% 2.43% 0.47%
Dean Witter
Kranzco Smith Bamey 6,400,000 600,000 $20.00 9.2/6 $128,000,000 $1.40 $0.85 $0.10 $3,950,000 $1,500,000 Shopping Center
Oppenheimer 9.38%7.0 4.5 05%30911%
PaineWebber
Kemper
LeggMason
Taubman Morgan Stanley 26,800,000 4,020,000 $11.00 8.0% $294,800,000 $0.578 $0.35 $0.10 $19,500,000 $2,211,000 Shopping Center
Alex Brown 15.00%5.5 3.8 09166% 07%
Dean Witter
Wellstord Merrill Lynch 4,000,000 600,000 $21.75 7.7% $67,000,000 $1.47 n/a n/a $1,897,874 $350,000 Residential
Kidder 15.00%6.6218 04%
Developer's Dean Witter 8,000,000 1,200,000 $22.00 7.30/ $176,000,000 $1.49 $0.88 $0.10 $1,650,000 nonetound Shopping Centers
Diversified Alex Brown 15.00% 6.77% 4.00% 0.45% 0.94% 0.00%
Prudential
McDonald
Carr Merrill Lynch 6,800,000 1,020,000 $22.00 7.7% $149,600,000 $1375 $0.82 $0.10 $3,578,000 $600,000 Oftice Building
Lehman 15.00% 6.25% 3.73% 0.45% 2.39% 0.53%
LeggMason
Manufactured Merrill Lynch 4,400,000 660,000 $25.75 7.8% $113,300,000 $1.80 $1.08 $0.10 $2,000,000 nonefound Residential
Home Comm. Lehman 15.00% 6.99% 4.19% 0.39% 1.77% 0.00%
General Goldman Sachs 16,500,000 2,475,000 $22.00 6.7% $363,000,000 $1.43 $0.90 $0.10 $5,400,000 $2,000,000 Shopping Center
Growth Kidder 15.00% 6.50% 4.09% 0.45% 1.49% 0.55%
Lehman
PaineWebber
Salomon
Mark Centers Kidder 7,750,000 1,162,500 $19.50 7.4% $151,125,000 $1.37 $0.85 $0125 $3,200,000 $980,000 ShoppingCenter
PaineWebber 15.00% 7.03% 4.36% 0.64% 2.12% 0.65%
TriNet Merrill Lynch 5,160,000 774,000 $24.25 9.0% $125,130,000 $1.63 $0.97 $0.10 $1,992,500 $1,312,825 Commercial Leases
PaineWebber 15.00% 6.72% 4.00% 0.41% 1.59% 1.05%
Tanger Merrill Lynch 4,100,000 615,000 $22.50 7.5% $92,250,000 $1.46 $0.87 $0.10 $1,900,000 $530,438 Factory Outlet
Bear Stearns 15.00% 6.49% 3.87% 0.44% 2.06% 0.58%
Factory Smith Barney 5,300,000 795,000 $23.00 7.8% $121,900,000 $1.61 $0.95 $0.10 $1,750,000 nonefound Factory Outlet
Outlet Prudential 15.00% 7.00% 4.13% 0.43% 1.44% 0.00%
Rob Humphrey
Holly Oppenheimer 6,640,000 996,000 $23.00 7.7% $152,720,000 $1.58 $0.90 $0.10 $2,625,000 $3,241,250 Residential
Bear Stearns 15.00% 6.87% 3.91% 0.43% 1.72% 2.12%
First Boston
Prudential
Piper JaUd t C Ay
Averages 8,326,923 1,221,346 $21.29 8.6% $160,217,308 $1.42 $0.85 $0.10 $4,042,183 $1,040,424
14.57% 6.630% 3.97% 0.50% 2.29% 0.64%
$180000 $.0 $.5 $.0 $,9000 $,0,01hpigCne
J. R. Ritter. Costs of going public
J. R. Ritter, Costs of going public
Table 2
1977-1982 initial public offers categorized by gross proceeds and contract type.
Firm Best Fraction
All commitment efforts best efforts
Gross proceeds (S)' offers offers offers offers
100.000-1.999,999 243 68 175 0.720
2.000.000-3.999,999 311 165 146 0.469
4.000.000-5,999.999 156 133 23 0.147
6.000.000-9,999,999 137 122 15 0.109
10,000,000-120,174,195 181 176 5 0.028
All offers 1028 664 364 0.354
' The gross proceeds categories are based on the nominal values; no price level adjustments have
been made.
Table 3
Direct expenses of going public as a percentage of gross proceeds, 1977-1982.
Number of Underwriting Other Total cash
Gross proceeds (S)' offers discount (%f expenses (%)f expenses (%)
Firm commitment offers
100.000-1.999.999
2.000,000-3.999.999
4,000.000-5.999,999
6,000,000-9,999.999
10.000.000-120.174,195
19.48
17.43
14.77
12.34
9.34
All offers 664 8.67 5.36 14.03
Best efforts offers
100.000-1.999.999
2.000.000-3.999.999
4,000.000-5.999.999
6.000.000-9.999,999
10,000,000-120.174.195
All offers
175 10.63
146 10.00
23 9.86
15 9.80
5 8.03
364 10.26
9.52
6.21
3.71
3.42
2.40
Table 4
Average percentage cash expenses and initial returns, and total transaction costs as a percentage
of realized market values, 1977-1982.
Number of Cash Avg. initial Avg. total
Gross proceeds ($S) offers expenses (%P returns (%f costs (%)d
Firm commitment offers
100.000-1.999.999 68 19.48 26.92 31.73
2.000.000-3.999.999 165 17.43 20.70 24.93
4.000.000-5.999.999 133 14.77 12.57 20.90
6.000.000-9.999.999 122 12.34 8.99 17.85
10.000.000-120.174.195 176 9.34 10.32 16.27
All offers 664 14.03 14.80 21.22
Best efforts offers
100.000-1.999.999 175 20.15 39.62 31.89
2.000.000-3.999.999 146 16.21 63.41 36.28
4,000,000-5.999,999 23 13.57 26.82 14.49
6.000,000-9.999.999 15 13.22 40.79 25.97
10.000.000-120.174.195 5 10.43 -5.42 -0.17'
All offers 364 17.74 47.78 31.87
"Gross proceeds categories are nominal; no price level adjustments have been made.
"The cash expenses are those reported in table 3.
'The initial returns are computed as (t - OP) + OP. multiplied by 100%. where v is the closing
bid price on the first day of trading and OP is the offer price. These are not annualized returns.
d Total costs are computed as 100% minus the net proceeds as a percentage of the market value
of securities in the aftermarket. Consequently. total costs are not the simple sum of cash expenses
and the average initial return.
'For best efforts offers of $10 million or more, the negative average total costs are due to the
price declines suffered by several offers. For three of the five firms in this category, net proceeds
exceeded the post-offer market value of the securities issued.
20.15
16.21
13.57
13.22
10.43
7.48 17.74
"Gross proceeds categories are nominal; no price level adjustments have been made.
"The underwriting discount is the commission paid by the issuing firm; this is listed on the
front page of the firm's prospectus.
'The other expenses figure comprises accountable and non-accountable fees of the underwriters,
cash expenses of the issuing firm for legal. printing, and auditing fees, and other out-of-pocket
costs. These other expenses are described in footnotes on the front page of the issuing firm's
prospectus. None of the expense categories include the value of warrants granted to the
underwriter, a practice that is common with best efforts offers.
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$1.5 million each.
In Ritter's overall sample only 64.6 percent of the underwriting
contracts are of the firm commitment type. In his largest sector ($10,000,000-
$120,174,195), which most closely resembles our study, the percentage
increases to 97.2. In our sample all 13 companies (100 percent) chose the firm
commitment contract.
Ritter breaks down the costs of his firm commitment contracts, again into
the five sectors. The average overall underwriting discount observed by
Ritter was 8.67 percent, with 7.24 percent for his largest sector alone. This
compares to the 6.63 percent average of our sample. Note that the .61 percent
difference amounts to $977,325.58 for our average size IPO. This is obviously
a significant figure to consider in negotiating an underwriting contract.
"Other expenses" for Ritter's overall sample were 5.35 percent of gross
proceeds, but only 2.10 percent for his largest sector. This compares to 2.93
percent for our sample, including estimated expenses, advisory fees, and other
miscellaneous expenses described in the prospectuses.
Total direct costs, which is just the sum of the underwriting discount
and other expenses, totalled 14.03 percent for Ritter's overall study, and 9.34
percent for his largest sector. In our sample we got 9.56 percent. These
figures might seem exorbitant, but the accounting and legal fees can add up
quickly. A privately owned real estate firm, which is not required to file periodic
statements or to use Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for its
bookkeeping, can be very costly to prepare for a public offering.
owned in partnership might require significant legal expenses in preparation for
conversion to a public REIT. Also, a few IPOs in our sample issued mortgage
certificate or loan offerings in conjunction with their REIT offering. The
underwriting fees associated with these mortgage related offerings were
included in our direct costs. Exhibit 3.3A compares the observed total direct
costs of our sample to Ritter's estimate (7% of Gross + $250,000).
Exhibit 3.3A
Ritter's equation underestimates the actual costs observed in our sample
by $1 million to over $16 million, or by 8 to 78 percent. The average
underestimate is 33 percent. We conclude therefore that Ritter's estimate is not
a useful tool for our equity REIT IPOs from 1991-1993.
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COMPANY Observed Ritter's Estimate Difference
Kimco $12,025,000 $9,210,000 $2,815,000
Kranzco $14,410,000 $9,210,000 $5,200,000
Taubman $37,201,400 $2098869000 $16,315,400
Wellsford $8,127,874 $6,340,000 $1,787,874
Developer's Divers. $13,570,000 $12,570,000 $1,000,000
Carr $13,728,000 $10,722,000 $3,006,000
Manfrd. Home $9,920,000 $8,181,000 $1,739,000
General Growth $30,995,000 $25,660,000 $5,335,000
Marks Centers $14,797,500 $10,828,750 $3,968,750
TriNet $11,716,125 $9,009,100 $2,707,025
Tanger $8,416,438 $6,707,500 $1,708,938
Factory Outlet $10,283,000 $8,783,000 $1,500,000
Holly $16,357,450 $10,940,400 $5,417,050
Properties
We have performed a simple regression to estimate our own equation to
predict the direct costs involved in an equity REIT IPO from 1991-1993. As
Ritter did, we used the actual observed total direct costs as the independent
variable and gross proceeds of the offering as the independent variable. We
came up with the following equation:
Total Direct Costs = $820,427 + 10.19 % of Gross Proceeds
The coefficient of determination (R-squared) for our equation is .88. This
means that using gross proceeds as the independent variable to predict the
total direct costs reduces the total variation of our estimate by 88 percent, or it
explains 88 percent of the total direct costs.
Exhibit 3.36
COMPANY Observed Kem's Estimate Difference
Kimco $12,025,000 $12,211,143 ($186,143
Kranzco $14,410,000 $12,211,143 $2,198,857
Taubman $37,201,400 $29,215,938 $7,985,462
Wellsford $8,127,874 $8,043,765 $84,109
Developer's Divers. $13,570,000 $17,111,731 ($3,541,731
Carr $13,728,000 $14,421,908 ($693,908
Manfrd. Home $9,920,000 $10,723,400 ($803,400
General Growth $30,995,000 $369164,649 ($5,169,649
Marks Centers $14,797,500 $14,577,286 $220,214
TriNet $11,716,125 $11,928,726 ($212,601
Tanger $8,416,438 $8,578,673 ($162,235
Factory Outlet $10,283,000 $11,599,630 ($1,316,630
Holly $16357,450 $14,739,796 $1,617,654
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As shown above in Exhibit 3.3B, the predictions made by our equation
are off from between -$5,169,649 and +$7,985,462 which really does not seem
that impressive. In terms of percentages we are off from between -21 percent
and +27 percent, with estimates being off by an average of 9.5 percent.
Although these numbers are not all that comforting they do provide a better
estimate than Ritter's equation.
Now let's move on to the indirect costs. As stated in chapter two,
these are primarily underpricing costs, which are measured by the initial
return. The initial return is the difference between the closing price of the stock
on the first day of trading and the original offering price. The initial return, as
well as the cumulative returns for days 2 through 10, are shown in Exhibit 3.4,
for all the REITs in our sample.'
ExhibIt 3.4
Cumulative Return to End of Trading Day as a Percent of IPO Price
COMPANY Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9 Day 10
Kimco 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.63% -0.63% -0.63% -0.63% -1.25%
Kranzco 0.00% 0.63% 1.25% 0.63% 1.25% 1.25% 1.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.63%
Taubman 5.68% 4.55% 3.41% 5.68% 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 6.82% 6.82%
Wellsford 3.45% 0.57% 3.45% 3.45% 3.45% 2.30% 2.87% 2.87% 2.87% 2.30%
Developer's 10.80% 12.50% 12.50% 10.80/a 11.93% 10.80% 11.36% 12.50% 11.36% 9.09%
Carr 13.07% 12.50% 10.80% 10.80% 10.23% 10.80% 10.80% 9.66% 8.52% 8.52%
Mnfrd Home 8.74% 10.19% 10.68% 9.22% 9.71% 12.14% 13.59% 16.50% 19.42% 25.24%
Gen Grwth 11.93% 14.20% 16.48% 17.05% 15.34% 14.20% 14.77% 14.200/ 15.91% 15.34%
Mark Ctrs 0.64% 1.28% 0.00% 4.49% 1.28% 1.28% 0.00% 0.00% 0.64% 0.64%
TriNet -2.06% -1.55% -1.03% 0.00%/ -1.55% -2.58% -4.64% -6.70% -5.67% -3.61%
Tanger 2.22% 0.00% -1.11% -0.56% -1.11% -1.11% -1.11% -1.67% -1.11% -1.11%
Factory 6.52% 4.35% 2.17% 0.54% 1.63% 2.17% 2.72% 3.26% 3.80% 3.26%
Holly 0.00% -2.17% -3.26% -2.72% -3.26% -3.26% -3.26% -3.80/a -3.26% -3.26%
Average 4.69% 4.39% 4.26% 4.57% 4.11% 3.99% 4.02% 3.90% 4.51% 4.82%
6 Sources
Transactions",
Corp., NYSE Dai
1991-1993.
include "The New York Stock Exchange Composite
The Wall Street Journal, and Standard and Poors,
ly Stock Price Record, McGraw-Hill, New York, N.Y.,
We see that the initial (Day 1) returns ranged from -2.06 percent to 13.07
percent, with an average initial return of 4.69 percent. This contrasts Ritter's
study where the average initial return was 14.8 percent overall, and 10.32
percent for the largest sector."' The result of our study also contrasts
lbbotson's study mentioned in chapter two of IPOs from 1960-1987, where an
average initial return of 16.4 percent was observed. Our result is also different
than the study of REIT IPOs mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, which
had an average initial return of -2.82 percent.
3.3.2 Information Disclosure
SEC regulations require issuers to disclose all material information in the
prospectus, but what is "material" may be subject to judgement. A recent
article describes how the chairman of a california-based computer software
provider died shortly after the IPO. The cause of death was an illness which he
had for a long time but which was not disclosed in the prospectus. The stock
price dropped radically. The prospectus did have, however, the standard
warning that the loss of any key employees or top executive could adversely
affect the company's business. 2 It will be interesting to see what the SEC
ruling is on this case.
6Ritter, p. 2 7 3 .
6 2William Power, "In IPOs, Some Data Seem to Be Overlooked By
Issuers as in Case of Santa Cruz Operation," The Wall Street
Journal, July, 27, 1993, p.C2.
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Many agree that prospectuses are not telling the whole story. Fred Carr
of the Penobscot Group commented that the laws are designed for full
disclosure, but in reality the prospectuses are being used to obscure
information. He added that investors are not happy about it. One consultant
stated that typical prospectuses contain information "that most investors would
consider immaterial and ancient history.""
My opinion is that, in general, the prospectuses provide a great deal of
valuable information. This information, however, is much more valuable to a
small, uninformed, investor who is not an expert in the real estate industry, than
it is to a large institutional investor who most likely employs someone with an
expertise in the field.
Reproduced in exhibit 3.5 is the Table of Contents for the Tanger
Factory Outlet Centers, Inc. We see that the section on "Risk Factors" is
broken down into 17 subsections. A closer look at the prospectus reveals that
these subsections are broken down even further. For instance, the subsection
on "Risks Related to the Factory Outlet Center Industry" is broken down further
into sub-subsections titled The Relatively Short History of Factory Outlet
Centers May Not Be Indicative of Future Periods, Dependence on Key Tenants,
Competition From Other Factory Outlet Centers, and Tenant Lease Expirations.
The subsection "General Real Estate Investment Risks" is broken down into
sub-subsections Economic Performance and Value of Centers Dependent on
6 3Pratt, "The IPO Information Gap", p.16.
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F-1
Many Factors, Risks of Development Activities, Dependence on Rental Income
From Real Property, Illiquidity of Real Estate Investments, Consequences of
Inability to Service Mortgage Debt, Short Operating History for Certain
Properties, Uninsured Loss, and Environmental Risks. These sub-subsections
are well-written and easy to understand even for an investor without prior real
estate knowledge. Furthermore, they are showered with warnings such as
"there can be no assurance that such relationships (with key tenants) will
continue..." and "there can be no assurance that this (factory outlet) segment of
the retail business will continue to grow in the future." If anything, I would
argue that the prospectus is filled with so many warnings about the inability to
predict the future of the REIT, that a small investor without much real previous
real estate knowledge, would either be foolish to invest in a REIT, or has a
preference for risk-taking.
Institutional investors, on the other hand, are very much aware of the
risks associated with real estate investments. Many of them have in-house
research departments, or subscribe to such services from outside sources.
Therefore, the information provided in these sections may be of little value to
them. Some information may be useful, such as the percent of the total gross
leasable area of the REITs properties that is leased by one tenant, but this type
of information is described in much greater detail elsewhere in the prospectus.
It is probably fair to say that the entire section on "Risk Factors" provides little
valuable information to a well-informed institutional investor, but important
information for any investor in real estate to understand.
In the "Business and Properties" section, statistics are given on the
percentage of each property that is currently leased, base rent, outstanding
mortgage debt, major tenants, lease expiration, date constructed, local
population demographics, proximity to major roadways, etc. This type of
information is essential in order to make fairly educated projections of cash
flows, and institutional investors expect it to be provided in the prospectus. I
would argue that without this type of information, as well as information on
management's experience, investment strategies, financing policies, etc., which
is also provided in the prospectus, institutional investors should not, and
probably would not, invest in REITs.
Small investors without real estate knowledge should be capable of
understanding the level of detail just described, but any degree of detail greater
than this might overwhelm the small investor, or perhaps it will simply be
disregarded. Institutional investors, however, would welcome additional
information on each property such as results of in-depth structural and
environmental studies on each property, comments by tenants and brokers who
toured the property but chose not to lease space there, a more comprehensive
photo package for each property, etc.
To sum up my opinion on the amount of information provided in the
prospectus of an equity REIT IPO, I would say that for institutional investors
who invest substantial capital in REIT stocks, it is not unreasonable to expect
information at the highest level of detail possible. The costs and time required
to produce this information, however, may prove to be prohibitive. Small
investors, on the other hand, who do not have much capital at stake, and who
have little prior knowledge about the real estate industry, are well-served by
information in prospectuses, and will not necessarily benefit from a more
detailed description of the properties, especially if there is an additional cost to
produce this information.
I would support, however, modifications to existing SEC rules that would
facilitate the inclusion of a section in the prospectus titled "Underwriter's
Projections." As mentioned in section 2.2.2, because of the liability issues and
current SEC regulations, such projections are not provided in the prospectus.
Consequently, small investors do not receive such information from the
underwriters, while institutional investors do.
When investors know or feel that they do not have complete information
they will either pass over a deal or require a higher rate of return in order to be
compensated for risking their investment. Lynne Sagalyn, professor at
Columbia University's Graduate School of Business, believes that complete
disclosure of information is the key to the long term appeal and success of the
REIT industry. She explains...
Developing a stronger basis for projecting future portfolio cash
flows requires information on rental income, occupancy rates and
operating expenses disaggregated by property type and expanded
upon with lease expiration schedules, pending lease transactions
and scheduled rent increases.. .These are the components that
form the financial basis for informed trading activity in real estate
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equities...As the market for publicly traded real estate grows, the
skill and resourcefulness with which information flows are used to
attract and service these (institutional) investors, is likely to
become a differentiating criteria among REIT
managements... Disclosure is the key tool in marketing not only the
initial stock offering but the ongoing management of a real estate
portfolio.. .Without advances in this arena, several years hence,
today's strong activity in real estate equity securitization is likely to
appear just as another spike of sporadic growth.64
Fred Carr of the Penobscot Group agrees. He advises potential issuers
that he expects a good real estate story which explains how money will be
earned given growth limitations. He wants it documented with property level
detail. He explains that "More information will lead to better trust and
understanding. If you don't tell it, how do we know that you understand it?"65
Mr. Carr pointed out later, however, that issuers who have been trying to
provide very detailed information in a prospectus are getting grief from the SEC.
Perhaps the ideal solution would be some modifications of securities
liabilities laws, which would encourage and facilitate complete, detailed, and up-
to-date information from REIT managers.
"Lynne B. Sagalyn, "Working Through the Kinks of Market
Growth: Information and the Securitization of Real Estate,"
Property, Vol. 3, No. 3, Spring 1993, p.5.
6 5Frederick Carr and John Pattillo, (Unpublished paper),
Boston, MA, April 21, 1993.
3.3.3 Underwriter Prestige
Observing the initial returns in Exhibit 3.4, and matching them to the
underwriters shown in Exhibit 3.2, one can only conclude that the underwriter's
reputation is not a good predictor of underpricing of equity REIT IPOs. Merrill
Lynch was the lead underwriter on 6 of the 13 IPOs in our sample. They
managed the IPOs with the highest and lowest average initial returns, with a
scattering of results in between. There is no consistency whatsoever in their
level of underpricing. Considering that they were the top ranked underwriter for
1992, and ranked second in 1991, this does not make sense. The average
initial return of the IPOs they managed was 4.23 percent, slightly less than the
4.69 percent average of our entire sample. One could say that on average they
underprice a little bit less. I learned recently though, that Merrill Lynch has two
different teams of investment bankers. One is located in New York and the
other is located in California. The TriNet deal, which had an initial return of -
2.06 percent was done by the California team. Although I do not attempt to do
it in this paper, a closer look at the results of various teams within each
investment banking firm might produce some interesting results.
Smith Barney managed 2 IPOs with average initial returns of 3.26
percent, and co-managed another which had an initial return of 0 percent.
They were ranked ninth in both 1992 and 1991 in terms of volume of IPOs
underwritten.
Oppenheimer managed just one IPO and co-managed another. Both
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had initial returns of 0 percent. Oppenheimer was not ranked in either the top
15 for 1992 or the top 10 for 1991 in terms of IPOs underwritten. Finally,
Goldman Sachs managed only the General Growth IPO, which had the second
highest initial return of our sample, at 11.93 percent.
For our sample one could not conclude that prestigious underwriters
underprice less. In fact, in our sample, the IPOs which were underpriced the
most were underwritten by the top ranked underwriters. Furthermore, in our
sample, even the underwriters who were not ranked highly in terms of volume
underwritten, are well-known firms in the securities industry. So based on the
small size of our sample and their relatively high level of prestige in general, it
is not possible to draw meaningful conclusions about the effects of underwriters'
reputations on the underpricing of equity REIT IPOs.
3.3.4 Signaling
Due to the short time period studied it is not practical to draw
conclusions about the applicability of the "good taste" or dividend theories. We
can however, test the short term (i.e. 10 days) applicability of the "publicity
causes a run up in prices" theory by analyzing Exhibit 3.4. Observing the five
IPOs with the highest initial returns we see that Carr Realty returns dropped
4.55 percent by day 10, General Growth increased 3.41 percent, Developer's
Diversified dropped 1.71 percent, Manufactured Home Communities increased
16.5 percent, and Factory Stores dropped by 3.26 percent. Manufactured
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Home Communities is the only IPO in the sample which experienced a
significant short term run up in price, therefore we must conclude that our data
does not support the theory for the short term 10 day period.
In order to properly test the applicability of the signaling theories we
need to analyze data from a much longer period of time. Perhaps future
studies of equity REIT IPOs during this time period will test for the validity of
the signaling theories.
3.3.5 Hot Markets
There is no doubt that we are in the midst of an equity REIT IPO hot
market. In the first half of 1991 there were no equity REIT IPOs. During the
second half of 1991 there was the Kimco deal which raised $128 million. In the
first half of 1992 $165 million was raised, followed by $507 million during the
second half. In the first half of 1993 we saw IPOs valued at $657 million. For
the second half of 1993 over $1 billion worth of new equity REIT IPOs has
already been filed with the SEC.66
The theory states that issuing firms time IPOs to coincide with heavy IPO
periods, when investors are hungry for new issues, and underpricing is less.
The evidence provided above may be explained by the theory. However, there
are other forces which contribute to the hot market. Not only are investors
seeking high yields currently provided by REITs, but issuing companies see
66"1Overview of the REIT Market," (Unpublished)
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REITs as a great opportunity to refinance their existing real estate portfolios
when not too many other options exist. I would argue that many of the new
REITs did not "time" their IPOs, but that the REIT vehicle was the best or only
viable option available to them at the time.
One might also question what effect a hot market might have on the
underwriting discount. It would seem that if underwriters were producing so
much more volume they would not demand such a high spread. However, as
the president of NAREIT points out that "Competition for investment bankers'
time...and for the best tax and accounting talent, is fierce."67 The head of
global equity transactions at Prudential Securities, commented that "IPO issuers
usually try to find an underwriting team with strong research capabilities, and
this emphasis has led to larger management teams and, consequently, higher
costs."6" For 1992, the average spread on all equity offerings was 5.09
percent, versus 6.03 percent for all IPOs (equity and debt).6 ' As mentioned
earlier, the average spread for our sample was 6.63 percent. It is probably fair
to say that although the competition for underwriting talent and the demand for
more research capabilities have driven the underwriting discounts upward, the
competition among the underwriters themselves for these fees has provided
downward pressure, resulting in a sort of new equilibrium underwriting discount.
67 NAREIT, "Bigger and Better, " The REIT Report, Vol. XIII, No.
3, Summer, 1993, p.11.
6 8Goggin, "Wall Street Gets Paid ... ", p.23.
69 Ibid p.23.
3.3.6 Insurance
If underpricing is a form of insurance for IPOs whose price might fall
below the IPO price shortly after trading, then TriNet might be the only one
which did not have a policy. They were the only firm in our sample that started
out with a negative initial return (-2.06 percent). That number had grown to -
6.70 percent by day 8, but recovered to -3.61 percent by day 10. Kimco,
Tanger and Holly also showed slightly negative returns within a few days of the
IPO. The low level of "over-pricing" will probably not lead to lawsuits for any of
the firms in our sample, but if it did there might be reason to support this
theory.
3.3.7 Flippers
In chapter two we learned that the strategy of flippers is to sell the
shares of an IPO, which they have bought at the offering price, by the end of
the first trading day in order to profit on the initial return. Observing the data in
exhibit 3.4 provides some interesting insights.
In our sample the mean initial return is 4.69 percent. An investor who
purchased an equal number of shares in each of our sample companies at the
offering price, would have only increased that return by .13 percent to 4.82
percent if they held the shares until day 10. Note that if it were not for the
extraordinary run up in the return of Manufactured Home Communities stock
from less than 10 percent to over 25 percent, the average return would have
dropped to 3.12 percent by day 10. This tells us that for our sample, flipping
the stock by the end of the first day would be an excellent strategy! It might be
a good idea to give the underwriters all of the tools they need to stabilize the
price.
Now lets consider a typical retail investor who was not able to purchase
shares at the offering price, but instead bought shares at the end of day one.
Since there is no appreciable increase in the average return within the first ten
days of trading, and there are transaction costs to consider, we must conclude
that small investors will not earn positive returns by flipping shares of equity
REIT IPOs which they can only buy after the first day of trading.
3.3.8 Insiders
The percentage of ownership of shares outstanding by the REIT's
management is important because it implies that the interests of management
and the shareholders becomes the same, or at least "more fully aligned." In
our sample the percentage of shares held by the directors, officers, managers,
and employees (insiders) of the companies ranged from 11.7 to 50 percent,
assuming all options to purchase shares were exercised.
As time progresses it would be interesting to see what effect the
percentage of insider shares would have on the price of the stock in the future.
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3.3.9 Trading Volume, Liquidity, and Range
As mentioned in the first chapter, one of the most attractive features of
REITs versus direct investment in real estate is their liquidity. But as we shall
see, liquidity is all relative.
In exhibit 3.6A we see the trading volume for the first ten days of trading
for each company in our sample. In raw numbers, all but one of the firms had
a first day trading volume in the millions. The second day volume dropped to
the mid six figure range, and within a few days the average trading volume was
down to around 100,000 shares. As of July 23, 1993 the trading volume of our
firms ranged from 6,000 to 79,900 shares, and averaged just 33,900, or .41
percent of the average number of shares issued. Noting that the firms in our
sample are among the largest equity REITs existing in terms of market
capitalization (# shares outstanding x price per share), it is interesting to
compare their trading volume to that of seasoned firms in other industries such
as computers, automobiles, and airlines. For example, The Wall Street Joumal
reported the following information about trading for July 23, 1993:
TRADING PERCENT OF SHARES
COMPANY VOLUME OUTSTANDING 70
Intel 2,811,400 .77%
Ford Motor 805,200 .18%
Delta 370,800 .75%
7 Percentages are estimated based on the number outstanding
shares as reported in the companies' 1991 annual reports. Intel's
estimate is adjusted to reflect a 2-for-1 stock split which
occurred since the printing of that annual report.
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Exhibit 3.6A - Trading Volume Per Day
COMPANY Dayl Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 Day6 Day7 Day8 Day9 Day10
Kimco 1,449,500 193,100 36,700 20,800 33,700 93,400 34,400 42,100 38,600 60,100
Kranzco 392,200 60,800 70,200 59,500 32,000 44,100 32,400 306,500 98,700 151,600
Taubman 4,673,900 658,500 493,200 454,900 74,900 190,200 184,700 145,800 150,200 114,400
Wellsford 1,242,900 233,400 157,500 60,500 27,000 85,300 37,200 46,100 30,800 60,000
Developer's 3,401,400 610,000 312,800 253,400 95,700 150,000 142,600 128,400 94,300 250,600
Carr 3,559,300 538,600 203,100 111,300 418,600 171,300 72,200 63,600 61,700 71,300
Mnfrd Home 3,298,600 358,500 219,600 93,300 110,100 79,500 60,900 55,100 69,000 146,300
Gen Grwth 5,194,300 705,200 717,700 390,400 277,100 244,800 322,500 161,400 225,200 152,800
Mark Ctrs 2,838,900 603,100 455,200 616,400 216,900 58,600 148,400 169,800 225,800 78,000
TriNet 2,101,600 357,600 165,800 176,300 101,700 77,100 81,500 60,100 30,200 22,700
Tanger 2,331,200 149,700 69,200 44,800 35,500 43,800 51,100 22,300 46,500 13,500
Factory 2,670,800 431,500 197,300 202,800 165,600 88,600 66,100 98,900 64,800 54,300
Holly 2,331,200 149,700 69,200 44,800 35,500 43,800 51,100 22,300 46,500 13,500
Average 2,729,677 388,438 243,654 194,554 124,946 105,423 98,854 101,723 90,946 91,469
Exhibit 3.6B - Trading Volume Per Day As A Percentage of IPO Shares Issued
COMPANY Dayl Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day8 Day 9 Day 10
Kimco 22.65% 3.02% 0.57% 0.33% 0.53% 1.46% 0.54% 0.66% 0.60% 0.94%
Kranzco 6.13% 0.95% 1.10% 0.93% 0.50% 0.69% 0.51% 4.79% 1.54% 2.37%
Taubman 17.44% 2.46% 1.84% 1.70% 0.28% 0.71% 0.69% 0.54% 0.56% 0.43%
Wellsford 31.07% 5.84% 3.94% 1.51% 0.68% 2.13% 0.93% 1.15% 0.77% 1.50%
Developer's 42.52% 7.63% 3.91% 3.17% 1.20% 1.88% 1.78% 1.61% 1.18% 3.13%
Carr 52.34% 7.92% 2.99% 1.64% 6.16% 2.52% 1.06% 0.94% 0.91% 1.05%
Mnfrd Home 74.97% 8.15% 4.99% 2.12% 2.50% 1.81% 1.38% 1.25% 1.57% 3.33%
Gen Grwth 31.48% 4.27% 4.35% 2.37% 1.68% 1.48% 1.95% 0.98% 1.36% 0.93%
Mark Ctrs 36.63% 7.78% 5.87% 7.95% 2.80% 0.76% 1.91% 2.19% 2.91% 1.01%
TriNet 40.73% 6.93% 3.21% 3.42% 1.97% 1.49% 1.58% 1.16% 0.59% 0.44%
Tanger 56.86% 3.65% 1.69% 1.09% 0.87% 1.07% 1.25% 0.54% 1.13% 0.33%
Factory 50.39% 8.14% 3.72% 3.83% 3.12% 1.67% 1.25% 1.87% 1.22% 1.02%
Holly 35.11% 2.25% 1.04% 0.67% 0.53% 0.66% 0.77% 0.34% 0.70% 0.20%
Average 38.33% 5.31% 3.02% 2.36% 1.75% 1.41% 1.20% 1.39% 1.16% 1.28%
Exhibit 3.6C - Range of Trading Prices Per Day (Hi Price Minus Low Price) $
COMPANY Dayl Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day8 Day 9 Day 10
Kimco 0.250 0.125 0.000 0.125 0.125 0.250 0.250 0.125 0.000 0.125
Kranzco 0.000 0.125 0.250 0.250 0.125 0.375 0.250 0.250 0.125 0.125
Taubman 0.375 0.125 0.250 0.125 0.125 0.250 0.000 0.125 0.375 0.125
Wellsford 0.500 0.750 0.500 0.250 0.250 0.375 0.250 0.250 0.125 0.250
Developer's 1.500 0.500 0.750 1.000 0.250 0.375 0.125 0.250 0.500 0.625
Carr 1.375 0.625 0.500 0.250 1.250 0.500 0.375 0.250 0.500 0.375
Mnfrd Home 1.250 0.500 0.375 0.500 0.375 0.750 0.625 0.750 1.125 1.125
Gen Grwth 0.750 0.500 0.750 0.250 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.500 0.375
Mark Ctrs 0.625 0.375 0.125 0.875 0.500 0.250 0.250 0.125 0.250 0.250
TriNet 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.750 0.250 0.875 0.375 0.375 0.625
Tanger 0.625 0.500 0.250 0.500 0.250 0.125 0.125 0.250 0.250 0.125
Factory 1.125 1.000 1.000 0.625 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.125 0.375 0.250
Holly 0.625 0.500 0.250 0.500 0.250 0.125 0.125 0.250 0.250 0.125
Average 0.740 0.481 0.433 0.452 0.375 0.327 0.298 0.250 0.365 0.346
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There are obviously many more buyers and sellers of stock in these
firms on a given day than for the stock of an equity REIT. The fact that the
trading volume is from 10 to 80 times larger for these stocks than for equity
REITs is an indication of the difference in liquidity.
Perhaps a more meaningful indication of relative liquidity of equity REITs
is shown in exhibit 3.6B. We see that on the first day of trading, on average
more than 38 percent of the shares issued in the IPO are traded. Flippers
undoubtedly play a part in this . On the second and third days the percentage
traded falls to 5.31 and 3.02, respectively. And from day five onward, the
volume of shares traded falls to below two percent of the shares outstanding.
For an institutional investor to be willing to purchase $20 million worth of stock
in a particular company is not uncommon. At our average size of $160,217,308
this represents roughly 12.5 percent of the outstanding shares. Since on any
particular day less than 2 percent of the outstanding shares of an equity REIT
are traded (less than .5 percent on July 23, 1993), it would be unlikely that the
investor would be able to liquidate (sell) all of its shares in the open market. It
might take several weeks or months to fully liquidate the holdings. In any
event, the price of the stock would certainly be driven down by the sell-off. For
such large investors, the attractiveness of the liquidity feature of REITs is
therefore largely reduced.
On the other hand, at a price of roughly $50 per share on July 23, 1993,
the value of the Intel stock traded on that day was $140,570,000. This is
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almost equal to the average size of an equity REIT IPO. Considering that this
represented less than 1 percent of the outstanding shares of Intel, it just further
emphasized the meaning of relative liquidity. The investor who owned $20
million worth of Intel stock would be probably be able to sell off its entire
holdings on a particular day without driving the stock price down.
Finally we come to the daily spreads of trading prices for our stocks.
Traders continuously buy and sell stocks throughout the day, hoping to buy
when the price is low and sell when the price is high. The profits (or losses)
they earn for their firm is the difference between these two prices. In exhibit
3.6C we notice that the average spread on the first day for our sample firms is
$.74 and drops to $.375 from day 5 onward. This means that from day 5
onward, a trader would have to buy at the low price and sell at the high price
many times over just to make a small profit. Combining the small trading range
with the fact that trading volume is small for equity REITs, and the fact that
most traders can only effectively follow a limited number of stocks at a time on
a daily basis, there may not be a lot of potential for profits in trading equity
REIT stocks.
3.3.10 Over-Allotment Option
In chapter two we explained that the intent of the green shoe was to
facilitate price stabilization by the underwriter. We also mentioned that some
believe it provides an incentive for the underwriter to underprice the issue so
that the entire issue will sell out , including the green shoe, thereby maximizing
profit for the underwriter. Referring back to exhibit 3.1 we see that twelve of
our thirteen sample firms gave the underwriter the maximum allowable 15
percent over-allotment option. The other firm (Kranzco) gave an option of 9.38
percent. It appears that most of our sample firms believe the "price
stabilization" explanation over the "incentive to underprice" theory.
The average green shoe option in our sample was 14.57 percent.
Neither Ritter's nor lbbotson's study reported on this statistic. The average
percent of options exercised in the equity REIT IPO sample was 63, similar to
the 66 percent reported in the 1983-1887 IPO study.
3.4 Underwriting & Investor Criteria, 1991-1993
Fred Carr of the Penobscot Group explained that the REIT offerings of
the early '70's were fee-driven, whereas today's equity REIT IPOs are more
sophisticated. With 20 additional years of portfolio management experience,
and a much wider selection of investment opportunities, investors can now
dictate what they want to see in a security. Needless to say, Wall Street
investment banking firms provide exactly what is called for, otherwise they
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would soon be out of business. The following list includes those characteristics
demanded of an equity REIT IPO today by investors and underwriters:"
a) Market capitalization should be at least $100 million.
b) Debt/equity ratio should be no greater than one to one.
c) The REIT should be self-managed.
d) The REIT should be focused on a particular property type with
management located in close geographic proximity to the
properties.
e) The REIT management team should be experienced in real
estate, and have a solid track record of creating value.
f) There must be a strategic plan for enhancing growth potential.
g) The REIT managers should be among the largest of the REIT
shareholders.
h) Little or no "cashing out" of prior owners.
i) The REIT is not an exit vehicle for troubled properties. Proper
due diligence must be carefully performed on each property.
j) Proceeds from the stock offering are to be used to retire debt or
acquire properties.
7 1Primary sources include: Carr and Pattillo; and Kidder,
Peabody, Inc. , "Real Estate Investment Trusts", Boston, MA, April
21, 1991.
k) Projected total returns must be 12-15 percent annually for three
years.
An inspection of exhibit 3.1 and a review of the individual prospectuses
indicates that most or all of these demands have been met by the firms in our
sample.
3.5 Surviving the Underwriting Process
Larry Miller, President of Bradley Real Estate Trust, the oldest REIT in
the country, and Senior Vice President of NAREIT, described the underwriting
process from the viewpoint of the issuing company. He said "Dealing with the
SEC rules, the IRS rules, and all the accountants and lawyers can be extremely
difficult and frustrating. But when the roadshows are over, the stock is trading,
and the deal is closed, you realize that it was all worth it."72
The entire process, from the decision to go public to the start of trading,
takes about 160 days, according to Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. Their
"Summary Timetable for Equity REIT Initial Public Offering" is reproduced
below: 73
72Comments made at the REIT Formation Workshop in Boston, MA
on April 21, 1993.
7 3NAREIT, "The Underwriting Process", REIT Formation : Getting
the Deal Done.
Days Prior
to Offering
160
159-150
145-135
130
120-115
110
100
95-91
90
85-81
80
75-71
70-66
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30
25
20
18-3
1
0
-5
Task
Decision to proceed with offering
Review and select lead manager
Negotiate deal terms and resolve open business issues
Finalize deal terms and summary financial models-lawyers begin
drafting registration statement
Due diligence meetings and property tours
First draft of registration statement distributed to
First draft of registration statement distributed to
Continue drafting registration statement
Second draft of registration statement circulated
select co-managers
Continue drafting registration statement
Third draft of registration statement circulated to
Property due diligence tour with co-managers
issuer
working group
to working group-
working group
Final drafting sessions of the registration statement begin
File registration statement with the SEC
Receive SEC comments to registration statement-begin
conforming document to SEC comments
File first amendment of the registration statement with the SEC
and print red herrings
Invite underwriting syndicate
Roadshow
Price offering (typically after the market closes)
SEC declares effectiveness-trading begins-print final prospectus
Closing and settlement
Of course the actual length of time it takes will vary from firm to firm
depending upon the number of partnerships involved, the condition of the
accounting records, the number and types of properties to be appraised, legal
proceedings in progress, etc. Chris Lucas, director of research for NAREIT,
warns that during the underwriting process it may be discovered that legal or
partnership issues will be difficult or impossible to overcome. He also points
out that up front costs can amount to several hundreds of thousands of dollars.
For these reasons he advises potential issuers to load the important tasks to
the front of the timetable, especially the ones which could cause problems.
Since an issuer can stop the underwriting process at any point, it would be
wisest to identify the trouble spots as early as possible, prior to incurring
substantial costs.74
3.6 Effect of Media Coverage on Initial Return
Publicity about any topic can shape the opinion of its audience
regardless of the validity of the information published. The equity REIT IPOs
covered by this paper have received their share of publicity.
Despite being the first equity REIT IPO in a few years, Kimco received
positive media coverage. Analysts wrote of its reputation as a "top-flight
company" and noted its positive attributes of being self-administered and
focused both geographically and by property type.75 Referring back to exhibit
3.4 we see that the stock price returns held steady after the IPO.
The Taubman deal got more mixed reviews. One article said "Taubman
has good properties, good management and a proven track record." The same
article referred to the UPREIT structure, which Taubman was the first to utilize,
as "convoluted", and pointed out that there were incestuous relationships which
7 4Comments made at REIT Formation Workshop in Boston.
7 5Betsy Treitler, "Kimco Realty Heads to Market as First REIT
IPO in Years," Investment Dealers' Digest, September 23, 1991,
pp.18-19.
could lead to conflict of interest. 6 In exhibit 3.4 we see that the initial return
was 5.68 percent which only moved up and down by about 1 percent in the two
weeks that followed. Its success was probably due to a combination of proper
pricing, positive publicity, and the fact that Kimco was trading at almost $28, up
40 percent from its IPO price of $20 just one year earlier.
Then Carr Realty did the unthinkable by creating an office building REIT
at a time when you could not give away such properties. Once again though,
reviews mentioned the "great organization" and "first class properties in one of
the country's two best office markets," as well as the potential for substantial
growth in income in a couple of years.77 Investors were probably a little over-
anxious, and maybe the flippers were all up to their tricks, causing the initial
return of 13.07 percent. This fell to 8.52 percent within a couple of weeks.
By the time General Growth went public, just the term "REIT" alone
would get investors excited. One article referred to the potential conflict of
interest in the UPREIT78 structure, and the fact that nobody saw much growth
potential in the offering. This article however, quoted a portfolio manager as
76Eric J. Savitz, "Shopping For a Mall? Mr. Taubman Has Just
the Thing (Maybe) For You, " Barron's, August 10, 1992, pp.14-15.
77 Barry Vinocur, The REIT Market Shifts Into Overdrive,"
Barron's, February 1, 1993, p.60.
78UPREIT stands for Umbrella Partnership REIT. It is similar
to a master limited partnership. In an UPREIT property is
exchanged for "units" of the Operating Partnership. Units are
essentially equal in value to shares of common stock. Issuers who
choose the UPREIT structure are able to defer recognition of an
otherwise taxable transfer of property.
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saying "As hot as these stocks are right now,...You really cannot afford to sit on
the sidelines." The article mentioned that Carr was the "worst" performing
equity REIT IPO of the previous six months, up only 21 percent since the
lPO. 9 Another institutional money manager commented "We used to steer
clear of REIT IPOs because you could always buy the stock six months or a
year later at a lower price.. .That's no longer true."80 General Growth
increased both the size of its offering and the IPO price by 10 percent, sold all
shares including the entire green shoe, and saw an initial return of 11.93
percent. By the end of the first two weeks the price had jumped even higher to
a return of 15.34 percent.
Stock performance of equity REIT IPOs came back to reality for the last
five firms in our sample. As a group they averaged less than a 1.5 percent
initial return, which decreased to -.8 percent within two weeks. There appeared
to be no media hype prior to these offerings. Barry Greenfield of Fidelity later
commented, "Prices are going higher but not at nearly the same pace as we
saw between November of 1992 and March of this year." He also said "There's
no question that some underwriters aren't doing a very good job of serving as
gatekeepers.. .I'm just focusing more on existing companies than IPOs right
79Barry Vinocur, "Where's the Growth? It's Lacking in a Mall
IPO, " Barron's, April 5, 1993, p.16.
8 Barry Vinocur, "How Property Shares Fared In the Quarter,
Barron's, April 12, 1993, p. 6 9 .
now."81 When such major players in the REIT industry make less than
optimistic remarks, there is bound to be some effect on the performance of
subsequent IPOs.
One equity REIT IPO which has yet to be offered is Crown American
Realty Trust. Kidder, Peabody, the lead underwriter, and the issuing company
are expecting it to be the biggest equity REIT IPO ever, with gross proceeds
exceeding $400 million. However, recent articles have had nothing good to say
about the offering. They point out that it has financially troubled tenants, no
property acquisition strategy or plans, too much debt, conflicts of interest
because the REIT managers also own the REITs major department store
tenant, an inexperienced "heir" to the CEO position, the usual potential conflicts
associated with the UPREIT structure (although most of the recent REIT IPOs
and over 90 percent of those in registration have used the UPREIT structure),
and too high of an estimated IPO price range." If ever an equity REIT IPO
was doomed to fail, it appears that this would be the one.
3.7 Final Comments On Equity REIT IPOs
The REIT industry is expected to grow substantially over the next few
decades. Mark Decker, the President of NAREIT, compares it to the mutual
8 Barry Vinocur, "REITs Rebound After Spring Slump," Barron's,
July 19, 1993, p.36.
8 2Barry Vinocur, "Big Debt Poses Risk to Big REIT," Barron's,
July 26, 1993, p.45, and Suzanne Woolley, "A Deal That's Looking
Dubiouser and Dubiouser," Business Week, July 26, 1993, pp.68-69.
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fund industry. He explains that after 30 years the mutual fund industry had
grown to $40 billion in total assets. That was in 1966. Now its assets are more
than $1.7 trillion. The REIT industry, Decker says, had assets of $44.4 billion
(roughly half of that was equity REITs) by its thirtieth birthday in 1990. He
writes, "While it is not likely that the REIT industry will progress to a trillion
dollars total asset industry, I believe it will likely reach the $200 - $500 billion
asset threshold in the next 10 - 20 years.""
Undoubtedly equity REIT IPOs will play a large part in this growth,
especially over the next couple of years. However, there are a couple of
events which will occur concurrently during this time period.
First, it is likely that the "five and fewer" rule will be eliminated as
described in section 1.9. This will enable institutional investors to acquire a
significant ownership stake in an equity REIT, and consequently they will be
able to exert substantial control over the performance of the REIT's
management. Currently there are provisions in most REITs' charters which limit
beneficial ownership by an individual to a maximize percentage of the total
shares outstanding. Although the stated purpose of this provision is to
"preserve the company's status as a REIT," it also serves as an anti-takeover
provision for the company's existing management. It is possible that the
legitimacy of such clauses will be opposed in court once the five and fewer rule
is eliminated. If such clauses are ruled illegal and unenforceable, REITs will no
8 3NAREIT, "Bigger and Better", p.11.
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longer be as attractive to potential issuers. The ability to defer taxable gains on
the sale of property, such as through the UPREIT structure, will be
overshadowed by the presence of large shareholders who will demand that
certain properties be disposed of regardless of the tax implications to the prior
property owners. Perhaps other clauses could be incorporated into the REIT's
charter preventing such sales, or providing for additional compensation to prior
owners upon such sales, but those clauses will reduce the value of the stock.
The government is not likely to consider waiving tax recognition of gains on
sales of those properties.
Second, interest rates will likely increase sometime in the near future.
Pure yield-oriented investors, such as mutual funds, will transfer their assets
from REITs to other less risky, high-yielding investments, and prices of income-
oriented REITs may fall. At that time the importance of pension funds as
investors in REITs will become pronounced. Pension funds are longer term
investors than mutual funds because they attempt to match income from their
investments with projected payments to beneficiaries. This strategy might have
a time horizon of several decades. Again, with the five and fewer rule
eliminated, pension funds will acquire large stakes in REITs only if they will
have the control required to ensure top performance by the REIT's
management, thus maintaining or increasing the value of their investment.
Potential issuers of equity REIT IPOs must understand the implications
of these events in order to properly address the decision of whether or not to
go public.
To conclude our analysis of equity REIT IPOs from 1991-1993 we asked
all of our sample firms the same survey questions that were discussed at the
end of chapter 2. Responses were received from 11 out of the 13 firms in the
sample. Wellsford did not return any phone calls, and Manufactured Home
Communities declined to comment (perhaps this has something to do with the
25.24 percent cumulative return to end of day 10 trading). Anyway, of the
responses we received the results are as follows:
How would you rate your underwriter's performance?
Excellent 55%
Good 36%
Fair 0%
Poor 0%
Some parts excellent,
others were poor 9%
Would you use the same underwriter to manage a second deal?
Yes 91%
No 0%
Undecided 9%
Rate the QUANTITY of research coverage by your lead investment
banker after the IPO.
Excellent 23%
Good 32%
Fair 9%
Poor 0%
Too soon to judge 27%
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Rate the QUALITY of research coverage by your lead investment banker
after the IPO.
Excellent 32%
Good 41%
Fair 0%
Poor 0%
Too soon to judge 27%
Rate the extent of research coverage by other firms.
Excellent 18%
Good 45%
Fair 0%
Poor 9%
Too soon to judge 27%
As with all 1992 IPOs, over 90% of equity REIT IPO issuers rated the
underwriter's performance as either good or excellent. All but one (91 percent)
of the sample firms responded that they would use the same underwriter to
manage a second deal, compared to 75 percent of the 1992 IPOs. In fact,
Kimco and Wellsford have already done so. And if we disregard the "too early
to judge" responses for the last three question, over 85 percent of the
remaining responses rated the quantity, quality, and extent of research
coverage to be either good or excellent.
From the viewpoint of the issuers of equity REIT IPOs from 1991-1993,
the overwhelming consensus is that the underwriters have done their job well.
And since investors continue to buy them up, and underwriters are earning
substantial fees, it appears that equity REIT IPOs from 1991-1993 are a good
deal for everyone.
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CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed the costs associated with an equity REIT IPO.
Using a sample of 13 such offerings which took place between November, 1991
and June, 1993, an equation was generated to predict the total direct costs
involved in an equity REIT IPO. The resulting equation estimates those costs
at $820,427 plus 10.19 percent of the gross proceeds of the offering. For the
sample firms, the total costs predicted by this equation varied from the actual
costs by an average of 9.5 percent. This compares to a study by Ritter of IPOs
in general which took place between 1977 and 1982. Ritter estimated the total
direct costs of an IPO to be $250,000 plus 7% of the gross proceeds of the
offering. Applying this equation to the sample firms yields estimates which vary
from the actual costs by an average of 33 percent.
Statistics for the first 10 days of trading for each equity REIT IPO in our
sample were collected, analyzed, and tested against other IPO theories. It was
observed that the underwriter's reputation is not a determining factor of the
success of an equity REIT IPO, as measured by the initial return. However, a
future study comparing the performance of separate "teams" within an
investment banking firm is recommended. An investment banker at Merrill
Lynch implied that their west coast team was responsible for their worst
performing equity REIT IPOs, while the east coast team had much greater
success.
An analysis of the cumulative returns to the end of trading for each of the
first 10 days concludes that "flipping" equity REIT IPO shares results in superior
returns for an investor who is able to obtain shares at the offering price. An
investor who must buy in the aftermarket will pay an average premium of 4.69
percent, only to watch their investment gradually decline in value. In other
words, if you can not buy equity REIT IPO shares at the offering price, then you
should not buy them at all. Of course we recognize throughout the paper that
the limited sample size and time period studied preclude us from being able to
make some very general conclusions about the performance of equity REIT
IPOs.
Many investors and advisors complain that the information provided in a
prospectus is incomplete and of little value. A review of the prospectuses of
the equity REIT IPOs in our sample revealed that much of the information
provided is more of an explanation of the real estate industry in general than a
description of the issuing firm. Although a lot of specific information on the
operation of the company is also provided, investors want more. The trouble is
that current SEC regulations prohibit and discourage issuers from providing
valuable information, despite the fact that the law requires full disclosure of all
material information. This leads to information asymmetry, as described by
Kevin Rock. The result is that institutional investors, because of their size and
wealth, are able to obtain valuable information about an equity REIT IPO from
the underwriters. This information is otherwise unavailable to small investors.
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Surveys of IPOs in general, and of the equity REIT IPOs in the sample,
show that issuers are overwhelming satisfied with the performance of their
investment bankers.
Finally, the future of equity REITs may hinge on proposed legislative
changes to the rules governing REITs. For instance, elimination of the "five
and fewer" rule will allow investors to acquire a larger percentage of ownership
in a REIT, and thereby empower the investor with more control over the REIT's
management. Whether or not this will discourage potential issuers of equity
REIT IPOs or encourage larger investment in them remains to be seen.
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Appendix A
Daily Stock Price Information - Equity REIT IPOs, 1991-1993
COMPANY: Kimco Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 11/22/91 Volume Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $20.00
Day 1 1,449,500 20.125 19.875 20.000 --- 0.250 0.00%
Day 2 193,100 20.000 19.875 20.000 0.000 0.125 0.00%
Day 3 36,700 20.000 20.000 20.000 0.000 0.000 0.00%
Day 4 20,800 20.000 19.875 20.000 0.000 0.125 0.00%
Day 5 33,700 20.000 19.875 20.000 0.000 0.125 0.00%
Day 6 93,400 20.000 19.750 19.875 -0.125 0.250 -0.63%
Day 7 34,400 20.000 19.750 19.875 0.000 0.250 -0.63%
Day 8 42,100 20.000 19.875 19.875 0.000 0.125 -0.63%
Day 9 38,600 19.875 19.875 19.875 0.000 0.000 -0.63%
Day 10 60,100 19.875 19.750 19.750 -0.125 0.125 -1.25%
AVERAGES 200,240 19.988 19.850 19.925 -0.028 0.138 -0.38%
COMPANY: Kranzco Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 11/12/92 Volume Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $20.00
Day 1 392,200 20.000 20.000 20.000 --- 0.000 0.00%
Day 2 60,800 20.125 20.000 20.125 0.125 0.125 0.63%
Day 3 70,200 20.375 20.125 20.250 0.125 0.250 1.25%
Day 4 59,500 20.250 20.000 20.125 -0.125 0.250 0.63%
Day 5 32,000 20.250 20.125 20.250 0.125 0.125 1.25%
Day 6 44,100 20.375 20.000 20.250 0.000 0.375 1.25%
Day 7 32,400 20.375 20.125 20.250 0.000 0.250 1.25%
Day 8 306,500 20.250 20.000 20.000 -0.250 0.250 0.00%
Day 9 98,700 20.125 20.000 20.000 0.000 0.125 0.00%
Day 10 151,600 20.125 20.000 20.125 0.125 0.125 0.63%
AVERAGES 124,800 20.225 20.038 20.138 . 0.014 0.188 0.69%
COMPANY: Taubman Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 11/20/92 Volume Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $11.00
Day 1 4,673,900 11.625 11.250 11.625 --- 0.375 5.68%
Day 2 658,500 11.625 11.500 11.500 -0.125 0.125 4.55%
Day 3 493,200 11.625 11.375 11.375 -0.125 0.250 3.41%
Day 4 454,900 11.625 11.500 11.625 0.250 0.125 5.68%
Day 5 74,900 11.625 11.500 11.500 -0.125 0.125 4.55%
Day 6 190,200 11.625 11.375 11.500 0.000 0.250 4.55%
Day 7 184,700 11.500 11.500 11.500 0.000 0.000 4.55%
Day 8 145,800 11.625 11.500 11.500 0.000 0.125 4.55%
Day 9 150,200 11.875 11.500 11.750 0.250 0.375 6.82%
Day 10 114,400 11.875 11.750 11.750 0.000 0.125 6.82%
AVERAGES 714,070 11.663 11.475 11.563 0.014 0.188 5.11%
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Appendix A (cont.)
Daily Stock Price Information - Equity REIT IPOs, 1991-1993
COMPANY: Wellsford Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 11/20/92 Volume Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $21.75
Day 1 1,242,900 22.625 22.125 22.500 --- 0.500 3.45%
Day 2 233,400 22.625 21.875 21.875 -0.625 0.750 0.57%
Day 3 157,500 22.500 22.000 22.500 0.625 0.500 3.45%
Day 4 60,500 22.625 22.375 22.500 0.000 0.250 3.45%
Day 5 27,000 22.625 22.375 22.500 0.000 0.250 3.45%
Day 6 85,300 22.625 22.250 22.250 -0.250 0.375 2.30%
Day 7 37,200 22.500 22.250 22.375 0.125 0.250 2.87%
Day 8 46,100 22.625 22.375 22.375 0.000 0.250 2.87%
Day 9 30,800 22.500 22.375 22.375 0.000 0.125 2.87%
Day 10 60,000 22.500 22.250 22.250 -0.125 0.250 2.30%
AVERAGES 198,070 22.575 22.225 22.350 -0.028 0.350 2.76%
COMPANY: Developer's Divers. Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 2/2/93 Volurne Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $22.00
Day 3,401,400 25.000 23.500 24.375 --- 1.500 10.80%
Day 2 610,000 24.750 24.250 24.750 0.375 0.500 12.50%
Day 3 312,800 25.250 24.500 24.750 0.000 0.750 12.50%
Day 4 253,400 25.000 24.000 24.375 -0.375 1.000 10.80%
Day 5 95,700 24.625 24.375 24.625 0.250 0.250 11.93%
Day 6 150,000 24.750 24.375 24.375 -0.250 0.375 10.80%
Day 7 142,600 24.500 24.375 24.500 0.125 0.125 11.36%
Day 8 128,400 24.750 24.500 24.750 0.250 0.250 12.50%
Day 9 94,300 24.750 24.250 24.500 -0.250 0.500 11.36%
Day 10 250,600 24.375 23.750 24.000 -0.500 0.625 9.09%
AVERAGES 543,920 24.775 24.188 24.500 -0.042 0.588 11.36%
COMPANY: Carr Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 2/9/93 Volume Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $22.00
Day 1 3,559,300 25.500 24.125 24.875 --- 1.375 13.07%
Day 2 538,600 25.125 24.500 24.750 -0.125 0.625 12.50%
Day 3 203,100 24.750 24.250 24.375 -0.375 0.500 10.80%
Day 4 111,300 24.500 24.250 24.375 0.000 0.250 10.80%
Day 5 418,600 24.250 23.000 24.250 -0.125 1.250 10.23%
Day 6 171,300 24.625 24.125 24.375 0.125 0.500 10.80%
Day 7 72,200 24.625 24.250 24.375 0.000 0.375 10.80%
Day 8 63,600 24.375 24.125 24.125 -0.250 0.250 9.66%
Day 9 61,700 24.375 23.875 23.875 -0.250 0.500 8.52%
Day 10 71,300 24.125 23.750 23.875 0.000 0.375 8.52%
AVERAGES 527,100 24.625 24.025 24.325 -0.111 0.600 10.57%
Appendix A (cont.)
Daily Stock Price Information - Equity REIT IPOs, 1991-1993
COMPANY: Mnfrd Home Comm Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 2/25/93 Volume Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $25.75
Day 1 3,298,600 28.750 27.500 28.000 - 1.250 8.74%
Day 2 358,500 28.500 28.000 28.375 0.375 0.500 10.19%
Day 3 219,600 28.625 28.250 28.500 0.125 0.375 10.68%
Day 4 93,300 28.625 28.125 28.125 -0.375 0.500 9.22%
Day 5 110,100 28.375 28.000 28.250 0.125 0.375 9.71%
Day 6 79,500 28.875 28.125 28.875 0.625 0.750 12.14%
Day 7 60,900 29.625 29.000 29.250 0.375 0.625 13.59%
Day 8 55,100 30.000 29.250 30.000 0.750 0.750 16.50%
Day 9 69,000 30.875 29.750 30.750 0.750 1.125 19.42%
Day 10 146,300 32.375 31.250 32.250 1.500 1.125 25.24%
AVERAGES 449,090 29.463 28.725 29.238 0.472 0.738 13.54%
COMPANY: General Growth Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 4/7/93 Volume Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $22.00
Day 1 5,194,300 25.000 24.250 24.625 --- 0.750 11.93%
Day 2 705,200 25.250 24.750 25.125 0.500 0.500 14.20%
Day 3 717,700 26.000 25.250 25.625 0.500 0.750 16.48%
Day 4 390,400 25.750 25.500 25.750 0.125 0.250 17.05%
Day 5 277,100 25.750 25.375 25.375 -0.375 0.375 15.34%
Day 6 244,800 25.375 25.000 25.125 -0.250 0.375 14.20%
Day 7 322,500 25.375 25.000 25.250 0.125 0.375 14.77%
Day 8 161,400 25.250 25.125 25.125 -0.125 0.125 14.20%
Day 9 225,200 25.500 25.000 25.500 0.375 0.500 15.91%
Day 10 152,800 25.500 25.125 25.375 -0.125 0.375 15.34%
AVERAGES 839,140 25.475 25.038 25.288 . 0.083 0.438 14.94%
COMPANY: Marks Centers Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 5/26/93 Volume Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $19.50
Day 1 2,838,900 20.250 19.625 19.625 --- 0.625 0.64%
Day 2 603,100 19.875 19.500 19.750 0.125 0.375 1.28%
Day 3 455,200 19.625 19.500 19.500 -0.250 0.125 0.00%
Day 4 616,400 20.375 19.500 20.375 0.875 0.875 4.49%
Day 5 216,900 20.250 19.750 19.750 -0.625 0.500 1.28%
Day 6 58,600 19.875 19.625 19.750 0.000 0.250 1.28%
Day 7 148,400 19.750 19.500 19.500 -0.250 0.250 0.00%
Day 8 169,800 19.625 19.500 19.500 0.000 0.125 0.00%
Day 9 225,800 19.750 19.500 19.625 0.125 0.250 0.64%
Day 10 78,000 19.750 19.500 19.625 0.000 0.250 0.64%
AVERAGES 541,110 19.913 19.550 19.700 0.000 0.363 1.03%
Appendix A (cont.)
Daily Stock Price Information - Equity REIT IPOs, 1991-1993
COMPANY: TriNet Corp. Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 5/26/93 Volume Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $24.25
Day 1 2,101,600 24.250 23.625 23.750 --- 0.625 -2.06%
Day 2 357,600 23.875 23.250 23.875 0.125 0.625 -1.55%
Day 3 165,800 24.125 23.500 24.000 0.125 0.625 -1.03%
Day 4 176,300 24.625 24.000 24.250 0.250 0.625 0.00%
Day 5 101,700 24.500 23.750 23.875 -0.375 0.750 -1.55%
Day 6 77,100 23.750 23.500 23.625 -0.250 0.250 -2.58%
Day 7 81,500 23.625 22.750 23.125 -0.500 0.875 -4.64%
Day 8 60,100 22.875 22.500 22.625 -0.500 0.375 -6.70%
Day 9 30,200 23.000 22.625 22.875 0.250 0.375 -5.67%
Day 10 22,700 23.500 22.875 23.375 0.500 0.625 -3.61%
AVERAGES 317,460 23.813 23.238 23.538 -0.042 0.575 -2.94%
COMPANY: Tanger Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 5/27/93 Volume Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $22.50
Day 1 2,331,200 23.000 22.375 23.000 --- 0.625 2.22%
Day 2 149,700 23.000 22.500 22.500 -0.500 0.500 0.00%
Day 3 69,200 22.500 22.250 22.250 -0.250 0.250 -1.11%
Day 4 44,800 22.750 22.250 22.375 0.125 0.500 -0.56%
Day 5 35,500 22.375 22.125 22.250 -0.125 0.250 -1.11%
Day 6 43,800 22.375 22.250 22.250 0.000 0.125 -1.11%
Day 7 51,100 22.375 22.250 22.250 0.000 0.125 -1.11%
Day 8 22,300 22.375 22.125 22.125 -0.125 0.250 -1.67%
Day 9 46,500 22.375 22.125 22.250 0.125 0.250 -1.11%
Day 10 13,500 22.250 22.125 22.250 0.000 0.125 -1.11%
AVERAGES 280,760 22.538 22.238 22.350 -0.083 0.300 -0.67%
COMPANY: Factory Stores Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 6/3/93 Volume Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $23.00
Day 1 2,670,800 25.125 24.000 24.500 --- 1.125 6.52%
Day 2 431,500 24.750 23.750 24.000 -0.500 1.000 4.35%
Day 3 197,300 24.000 23.000 23.500 -0.500 1.000 2.17%
Day 4 202,800 23.625 23.000 23.125 -0.375 0.625 0.54%
Day 5 165,600 23.500 23.250 23.375 0.250 0.250 1.63%
Day 6 88,600 23.625 23.375 23.500 0.125 0.250 2.17%
Day 7 66,100 23.750 23.500 23.625 0.125 0.250 2.72%
Day 8 98,900 23.750 23.625 23.750 0.125 0.125 3.26%
Day 9 64,800 23.875 23.500 23.875 0.125 0.375 3.80%
Day 10 54,300 23.875 23.625 23.750 -0.125 0.250 3.26%
AVERAGES 404,070 23.988 23.463 23.700 -0.083 0.525 3.04%
Appendix A (cont.)
Daily Stock Price Information - Equity REIT IPOs, 1991-1993
COMPANY: Holly Residential Trading Hi Lo Close Net Trading Return
IPO Date: 6/11/93 Volume Price Price Price Change Range To IPO
IPO Price: $23.00
Day 1 2,331,200 23.000 22.375 23.000 --- 0.625 0.00%
Day 2 149,700 23.000 22.500 22.500 -0.500 0.500 -2.17%
Day 3 69,200 22.500 22.250 22.250 -0.250 0.250 -3.26%
Day 4 44,800 22.750 22.250 22.375 0.125 0.500 -2.72%
Day 5 35,500 22.375 22.125 22.250 -0.125 0.250 -3.26%
Day 6 43,800 22.375 22.250 22.250 0.000 0.125 -3.26%
Day 7 51,100 22.375 22.250 22.250 0.000 0.125 -3.26%
Day 8 22,300 22.375 22.125 22.125 -0.125 0.250 -3.80%
Day 9 46,500 22.375 22.125 22.250 0.125 0.250 -3.26%
Day 10 13,500 22.250 22.125 22.250 0.000 0.125 -3.26%
AVERAGES 280,760 22.538 22.238 22.350 -0.083 0.300 -2.83%
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